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Abstract 
The increasing presence of  the People's Republic of  China's in sub-
Saharan Africa is one of  the most significant phenomena in the political 
economy of  development since the end of  the Cold War. This same 
period has been characterised by the dominance of  Western politico-
economic norms within development. As a 'normative power' within this 
hegemonic development discourse, the European Union has had a 
position of  asymmetric power (soft imperialism) with ability to impose 
norms upon sub-Saharan Africa through political conditionalities. This 
thesis therefore asks if  the EU's position of  relative power is 
compromised by the alternative political approach of  Chinese 
development assistance. Using a social constructivist approach, EU and 
China development policies are traced to their domestic origins. Actor-
specific approaches to soft power are also included. Culture is 
incorporated into the analysis to overcome Eurocentrism by 
contextualising European cultural universalism, while also expanding on 
differences in construction of  interests, and governance. Both actors' 
approaches to development are compared and contrasted to determine 
to what extent they diverge, and what probability of  convergence exists. 
Ultimately, it is determined that the EU's soft imperialist ability to 
impose politico-economic norms through development assistance has 
diminished due to China's development presence in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Many features of  the Chinese approach are attractive to African political 
elites, including China's pragmatic approach to development, putting 
great emphasis on local context, as well as having a culture that promotes 
diversity in the global system while European cultural universalism 
promotes homogeneity. The existence of  the Chinese option increases 
policy space for African governments. Due to major cultural and 
historical differences, China is unlikely to adopt a political approach to 
development that converges with that of  the EU. Nonetheless, due to 
Chinese pragmatism and the EU’s soft power approach, as well as EU-
China economic interdependence, political confrontation is highly 
unlikely and dialogue possible. 
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Abstract 
Die zunehmende Präsenz der Volksrepublik China in Subsahara-Afrika 
stellt heute eine der bedeutendsten Phänomene der politischen 
Ökonomie seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges dar. Dieser Zeitraum 
wurde durch eine Dominanz westlicher politisch-ökonomischer 
Entwicklungsnormen geprägt. Dabei nahm die Europäische Union in 
hegemonialen Entwicklungsdiskursen eine Position asymmetrischer 
Macht ein (soft imperialism). Durch die Verknüpfung von 
Entwicklungshilfe und politischen Bedingungen hatte sie die 
Möglichkeit, eigene Normen auf  Subsahara-Afrika zu übertragen. Die 
vorliegende Arbeit geht folglich der Frage nach, ob die durch relative 
Macht gekennzeichnete Position der EU die alternativen Ansätze der 
chinesischen Entwicklungshilfe beeinträchtigt hat. Dabei werden mittels 
eines sozial-konstruktivistischen Ansatzes die jeweiligen  
Entwicklungskonzepte der EU und Chinas bis zu ihrer 
Entstehungsperiode zurückverfolgt. Akteur-spezifische Ansätze zur soft 
power sind ebenfalls enthalten. Kultur wird in die Analyse einbezogen, um 
die Gefahr von Eurozentrismus durch die Kontextualisierung des 
europäischen kulturellen Universalismus umzugehen und gleichzeitig auf  
Unterschiede der Interessenskonstruktion auf  governance-Ebene 
einzugehen. Die Ansätze beider Akteure in Bezug auf  Entwicklung 
werden verglichen und gegenübergestellt um festzustellen inwieweit 
Divergenz- oder Konvergenzmomente sich erkennen lassen. Schließlich 
wird gezeigt, dass die Fähigkeit der EU durch soft imperialism politisch-
ökonomische Normen über Entwicklungshilfe auf  Subsahara-Afrika zu 
übertragen, durch die Präsenz Chinas und seiner Entwicklungspolitik auf  
dem Kontinent, geschwächt wurde. Viele Charakteristika des 
chinesischen Ansatzes, einschließlich eines pragmatischen 
Entwicklungsansatzes, sind für afrikanische politische Eliten attraktiv. 
Unter anderem wird geschätzt, dass China großen Wert auf  lokale 
Kontexte legt und eine Kultur verkörpert, die in einem globalen System 
Vielfalt fördert. Dagegen steht der europäische kulturelle Universalismus, 
der grundsätzlich nach Homogenität verlangt. Die Existenz der 
chinesischen Option erhöht den politischen Spielraum für afrikanische 
Regierungen. Aufgrund großer kultureller und historischer Unterschiede, 
ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass die politischen Entwicklungsansätze der EU 
und Chinas sich vereinbaren lassen. Dennoch ist aufgrund des 
chinesischen Pragmatismus und des soft-power-Ansatzes der EU, aber auch 
wegen gegenseitiger europäisch-chinesischer Wirtschaftsabhängigkeiten 
politische Konfrontation höchst unwahrscheinlich und ein Dialog 
möglich. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
So we will share this road we walk 
And mind our mouths and beware our talk 
Till peace we find tell you what I'll do 
All the things I own I will share with you 
If  I feel tomorrow like I feel today 
We'll take what we want and give the rest away 
Strangers on this road we are on 
We are not two we are one 
Strangers by The Kinks1 
 
1.1 Why China? 
 It is always necessary to answer the so-called “so what?” question when 
one chooses to address a given topic. In the case of  this thesis, the 
answer may be obvious. The increasing presence of  China in sub-
Saharan Africa has changed the face of  development – this has in turn 
led to rather fervent research across the social sciences on this topic. I 
have decided to focus on the implication this trend has on the political 
discourse surrounding development (with an emphasis on culture), 
though admittedly when looking at China in Africa, there are a plethora 
of  angles that one could analyse. As much as the People's Republic of  
China is criticised for its role in Africa, and as little as its internal political 
system is understood, the ultimate question of  how development 
discourse might change as a result of  China’s involvement south of  the 
Sahara is certainly intriguing, if  not essential.  
 From an historical perspective, China is certainly not 'the new kid on the 
block' as is presented in certain sectors of  the Western media. Indeed, 
the infancy of  China's relationship with Africa has long passed. By 
analogy, using 1956 as the starting point, when a young, revolutionary 
China (aged seven) became engaged quite dynamically in the African 
neighbourhood. With China achieving recognition of  the global 
community in 1971 (through accession to the United Nations), its 
friendship with Africa had paid off  through their political support in 
                                                 
1 The Kinks, Strangers, The Darjeeling Limited (Universal, 2008). 
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return. Starting in the late 70s, now in its late twenties, China began to 
focus inward, on itself, developing the capabilities to be autonomous, 
and industrious, something that any driven person (or nation in this 
instance) at such an age would aspire to. Towards the end of  the 80s, as 
China found itself  increasingly isolated by the events of  Tiananmen, 
1989, it quite literally, was in need of  friends. By this time, China had 
grown wiser, having abandoned the revolutionary motives of  its 
adolescence, opting for a more pragmatic approach which, now entering 
its forties, would help pull the People's Republic out of  its midlife crisis, 
as it were. In need of  allies in the global neighbourhood, China turned 
back to Africa, renewing friendships and eventually forming 
progressively stronger partnerships. Once China had turned fifty, in 
1999, its year over year exchange with its African, 'all-weather friends' 
was increasing exponentially. Now past its sixtieth year, China's coming 
of  age, and half  a century of  involvement in African development both 
merit analysis. 
 
1.2 Why Europe? 
 The European Union is a unique political formation, and a model for 
regionalism occurring the globe over. The EU is an interesting actor, 
encompassing former colonial powers, and discursively focused more on 
normative rather than material power. The EU and sub-Saharan Africa 
not only share a colonial legacy, but there is also a history of  
development assistance that goes back to 1963 with the first Yaoundé 
convention between the European Economic Community and former 
African colonies. The EEC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of  States were aligned with the signing of  the Lomé conventions 
in 1975. European development policy has more or less followed global 
(hegemonic) trends in development, so it is interesting to see how a 
more just preferential trade agreement of  the 1970s and Lomé would be 
displaced by the prospect of  neoliberal free trade and political 
conditionalities aimed especially at strengthening economic reform, 
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finally confirmed in the Cotonou agreement in 2000. While the EU 
struggles in certain policy areas to maintain a unified position, 
development is somehow different. While contributions between a 
development-conscious country like Denmark and a former-communist 
country like Slovakia are radically different, they subscribe to variations 
of  the same hegemonic development discourse based on the liberal 
international order. Indeed, many of  the acquis communautaires, 
conditionalities requisite to join the union, themselves function similarly 
to the political conditionalities that are a product of  this discourse. More 
than twenty years past the end of  the Cold War, there are now ten and a 
half  former communist countries in the EU. Nowhere else has the 
triumph of  the liberal democratic order been more directly felt. Thus, 
where China is perceived as a challenge to the hegemonic order and 
development discourse, of  which the EU is a member, it is essential to 
understand the dynamics of  such a relationship. Add to that the 
complexity of  China-EU trade interdependency, and the increasing 
displacement of  Africa's erstwhile biggest development partner, Europe, 
by its meanwhile biggest development partner, China, and we have 
ourselves a narrative worthy of  academic attention.  
 
1.3 Why Compare China and Europe in sub-Saharan 
Africa? 
 Since the end of  the Cold War, the dominant paradigm in development 
has carried with it the neoliberal and liberal democratic ideals of  the 
Western-led, hegemonic global order. With its explicit emphasis on the 
spread of  norms, the European Union is an important actor within this 
configuration. Indeed, due to the uneven power relations between the 
EU and African 'partners', the EU has had the ability to impose its 
priority political norms through political conditionalities. This represents 
a form of  imposed soft power: soft imperialism. 
 However, this existing power dynamic may be changing. Building upon a 
significant history of  development cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa, 
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the People's Republic of  China has dramatically increased its trade and 
development assistance with the region over the past decade and a half. 
Chinese trade has jumped from over US$10 billion in 2000 to over 
US$100 billion in 2010; while Africa is set to receive US$10 billion in 
Chinese preferential loans between 2010 and 2012.2 China's increasing 
presence here, however, has significance beyond mere economic 
consideration. The shifting political context of  development discourse in 
sub-Saharan Africa is an important consideration, especially in that the 
Chinese approach to development does not follow the conventions of  
the 'traditional donors'. As will be investigated here, the domestic 
political and cultural roots of  China's approach to development differ 
greatly from those of  the EU. In light of  this, it will be important to see 
to what extent China's presence impacts European development 
hegemony in the region.  
 This thesis is therefore meant to identify the basis for a major shift 
occurring in external influence on international development. This topic 
is of  significance for several reasons. The rise of  powers of  the global 
South in the international political economy is an important 
phenomenon for the present and future. China is at the forefront of  this 
rise, and ultimately, the changing political context of  development may 
also shed light on future dynamics of  the global system as a whole as it 
moves towards multipolarity. Also, any kind of  change of  the power 
balance surrounding the development discourse will have serious 
implications for sub-Saharan Africa, especially as the Chinese option 
reduces dependence on Western conditional aid, thus potentially opening 
up policy space for African states to pursue a wider array of  
developmental approaches.  
 How can we account for China's approach to development and how 
does it relate to the presently dominant approach to development? While 
the impact of  each approach on the ground, in sub-Saharan Africa, is 
important; the domestic political, cultural, historical and strategic realms 
                                                 
2 China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation (Bejing: Information Office of  the State Council, 
The People’s Republic of  China, 2010), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/23/c_13661632.htm. 
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are essential to understanding the construction of  development policy.3 
Cognisance of  these contextual factors will serve several other purposes. 
Firstly, it will serve to place, or contextualise, the EU's hegemonic 
development discourse within its European/Western context, thus 
helping to overcome the Eurocentric structural and analytical aspects 
that currently underlie international relations. This includes identifying 
European universalist cultural norms as context-specific, in contrast to 
Chinese particularist cultural norms, both of  which have a great impact 
on respective development approaches. Secondly, as development policy 
emerges out of  domestic context, an understanding of  these contexts 
will help in determining how the EU and PRC development approaches 
diverge, and to what extent they might foreseeably converge. 
 Ultimately the domestic factors that underlie Chinese and European 
approaches to development will be linked to the respective international 
'systemic cultures' they represent. These are identified as the hegemonic 
development discourse in the case of  the EU, emphasising democracy 
and neoliberalisation, while China's push for an alternative political and 
economic order emphasises diversity, and reinforces the supremacy of  
the state. The institutionalisation and proliferation of  China's heterodox 
development discourse represents a relative challenge to the prevailing 
hegemonic development discourse. 
 
1.4 Organisation of  the Thesis 
 This first chapter introduces the topic, providing background and 
context for those that follow as well as identifying issues within the 
enquiry. The second, theoretical chapter outlines the social constructivist 
approach of  the thesis. This idea-based approach to international actors 
helps in analysing how their domestic construction affects external 
development policy. Also essential to the construction of  policy is 
                                                 
3 Lancaster emphasises the importance of  understanding domestic politics in the construction 
of  development policy. Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics 
(London: The University of  Chicago Press, 2007). 
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culture. This distinction proves important as respective EU and PRC 
conceptions of  soft power are culturally-based. Theories explored 
include China's 'soft use of  power' approach, and the EU's 'civilian 
power' and 'soft imperialism' approaches. Ultimately, important concepts 
such as Gramsci's 'hegemony', Cox's 'world orders' and Foucault's 
'regimes of  truth' are introduced in order to analyse the power and 
legitimacy of  the hegemonic development discourse, against which 
China's increasing influence must be compared.  
 The third chapter begins by placing the EU within the hegemonic 
development discourse. Europe as a normative power is discussed with 
particular reference to European cultural universalism. This explains the 
European need to spread norms, in a contemporary context especially 
related to neoliberalism and good governance. Ideas such as Eurocentric 
developmentalism and diffusionism, as well as modernisation give 
further background to the spread of  European norms globally. The 
chapter then charts the historical involvement of  the EU in sub-Saharan 
Africa; from its predecessor, the European Economic Community and 
the Lomé conventions to the EU and the Cotonou Agreement. A 
parallel trajectory of  internal EEC/EU reform and changing priorities in 
its development policy are visible as it shifted from being almost entirely 
economic, to becoming highly politicised. Contemporary institutions and 
policies are then analysed, demonstrating the importance of  political 
conditionalities and economic liberalisation along with regionalism in EU 
development policy.  
 Chapter four begins by discussing Chinese (political) culture and its 
impact on Chinese foreign and development policies. The background 
of  China's non-interference and mutual respect doctrine is given context, 
especially in light of  Confucian ideas such as harmony and respect for 
diversity. An important cultural aspect to foreign policy, guanxi, is 
discussed with the emphasis on paired relationships maintained in the 
long-term through confidence building, is an indication of  the difference 
in construction of  Chinese interests. The parallel internal changes 
reflected in development policy, from ideology to pragmatism, are also 
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examined. Then China's historical relations with Africa are overviewed: 
from the revolutionary spread of  Maoism through African solidarity in 
UN accession, to the Tiananmen crisis. It was with the latter event that 
China and Africa set the foundation for today's high level of  
cooperation. The structure of  Chinese development assistance is then 
discussed.  
 Then in chapter five, the discussion section, various aspects of  Chinese 
and European approaches to development will be compared and 
contrasted. Starkly different cultural outlooks are discussed as they relate 
to Europe's universalist approach (pushing for global homogenisation) 
versus China's particularist approach (pushing for global diversity). This 
further emphasises the crucial need for context in understanding the 
construction of  development policy and discourse. Domestic political 
factors such as strategic priorities and governance will be discussed as 
they impact respective EU and Chinese development policies. Both EU 
and PRC approaches to development will be reviewed, also looking at 
the failure to date of  EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation. It will be 
argued that the Chinese-led Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
represents an alternative systemic culture regarding development 
discourse. Thus, the EU's soft imperialist position in sub-Saharan Africa 
has weakened. Nonetheless, the Chinese are constrained by both 
economic interdependence with the EU, and by cultural priorities 
including harmony and pragmatism. The discussion will conclude with 
African prospects, mainly insisting that the Chinese presence fits with the 
interests of  African political elites, as it opens up greater policy space for 
more diverse approaches to development to be implemented. 
 In the final, sixth Chapter, concluding arguments are presented. Using 
the case of  EU versus Chinese approaches to development in sub-
Saharan Africa, it is postulated that the thesis provides a new 
understanding of  the intersection of  culture and domestic politics in the 
construction of  development discourses. This understanding highlights 
the importance of  viewing international relations as intercultural 
relations as we move towards a multipolar world. In such a situation the 
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construction of  both European and Chinese interests through their self-
image, politics, culture and history are all contextual factors that must be 
taken into account when analyzing the relationship of  these ‘traditional’ 
and ‘emerging’ development actors. The thesis has identified the 
importance of  (1) domestic politics and (2) culture in influencing the 
construction of  external development policies, contributing to the 
construction of  (3) systemic cultures on the global levels that sustain 
these discourses. Culture, a major component of  domestic politics often 
ignored in political analysis, will be identified throughout this body of  
work as being essential to understanding the diverging development 
discourses of  the EU and China. The systemic cultures associated to the 
development approaches of  both actors are at odds. Ultimately, on 
regional and bilateral levels the divergence of  these systemic cultures 
creates policy space where only one systemic culture, the hegemonic 
development discourse, used to dominate. There is thus evidence that 
the EU’s soft imperialist position in Africa has surely been impacted by 
Chinese development assistance. Indeed, for African states the existence 
of  the Chinese option opens up new policy space for development. 
Ultimately, as a result of  EU-China economic interdependence, and the 
centrality of  soft power to both actors’ foreign policies, dialogue is 
possible and political confrontation between the two will be highly 
unlikely.  
 The scope of  this thesis is limited to the two major external actors in 
African development. African perspectives are not given adequate 
attention due to the already large scope of  the thesis. However, this 
analysis should provide vital context as to the construction of  
development policy for two important actors for Africa. Ultimately, this 
work is meant to underpin future research as to the impact of  the policy 
space created by China’s increasing presence on political development in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Chapter Two: Social Constructivism,  
Culture, and Soft Power 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This theoretical chapter will begin by addressing how international actors 
at their core can be analysed as 'ideational' in nature. This comes from 
social constructivist analysis. The construction of  interests through ideas, 
and an emphasis on norms of  international political actors is highlighted.  
The concept of  'systemic cultures' will be introduced in order to see how 
international structures are constructed, and how they are dynamic, not 
static.  
 The chapter then discusses the importance of  culture, enabling us to 
view international relations on the basis of  more complex social 
interactions, where diverse conceptions of  the political collective, 
interests, world order and even ideology emphasise international 
relations as being intercultural relations.4 Culture is an important factor 
in helping to overcome the Western-centric bias of  international 
relations analysis, recognising that Western-constructed norms have a 
cultural context, despite their universalistic claims. It is also important to 
recognise the impact of  culture on interests and norms, which ultimately 
inform development policy. The theory of  'constrained relativism' will 
also help in understanding what kind of  social solidarities differently 
structured cultures tend towards, and how structural differences (e.g. 
individualistic vs. hierarchical) affect interests, norms, and policy.  
 Theories of  soft power will then be discussed, beginning with concepts 
of  'civilian power', 'soft imperialism' and 'Normative Power Europe' all 
pertaining to the European Union, and the spread of  norms that is 
integral to EU international relations. The 'soft use of  power' approach 
will then be discussed as it relates to how power is used in a prudent way 
in social relationships. This theory has been developed in the Chinese 
international relations literature. 
                                                 
4 Adda Bozeman (1994) qtd. in Jiangfeng Chen, “The Practice of  the Mean: China’s Soft 
Power Cultivation,” in Soft Power : China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, ed. Mingjiang 
Li (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009), 83-102. 
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 Finally, this theory section will go over concepts related to power 
relations in the international system including Gramsci's concept of  
'hegemony' and Cox's complementary definition of  'world orders', as 
well as Foucault's ideas on discursive power relations and so-called 
'regimes of  truth'.  
 The ideas discussed throughout this theoretical section will be applied to 
both actors in assessing their relative soft power, the norms and 
conceptions of  world order that they seek to promote, emphasising that 
they are socially constructed actors, and that culture matters in 
understanding their respective societal and therefore development policy 
priorities.    
 
2.2 Taking a Social Constructivist Approach 
 This thesis deals with a question as to whether there is a major shift 
happening on the discursive level in development. The aspect of  political 
discourse is just one dimension of  a broader politico-economic shift that 
is seeing the rise of  Southern nations in the global system, including but 
not limited to the BRIC countries.5 In order to find an appropriate 
approach to an increasingly dynamic international system, we must think 
first of  all about what kind of  scientific implication a more multipolar 
world has within the field of  international relations (IR). For a long time, 
IR been dominated by a Eurocentric analysis of  international reality. 
Indeed, the domination of  Realists has set the international scene in 
stone, as they suppose it to be ruled by hard rules of  materialist self-
interest and rationality. It is clear that if  we are seeking to chart an 
evolving international system, including the essential role of  ideas, (the 
use of) Realism (as a theoretical perspective) would hinder this effort.6  It 
is a dynamic shift in the international system, especially in ideas and 
norms, that this thesis attempts to capture. It is for this reason that a 
more social/interpretivist approach will be employed: namely, a social 
                                                 
5 The BRIC countries are: Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
6 The assumption of  a static international system is counterproductive to the attempt of  this 
thesis to display that the international system is changing through the rise, especially, of  non-
European actors; thus problematising the preeminence of  Eurocentric thought in 
International Relations more broadly. 
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constructivist approach.7 
 Social constructivism, following Alexander Wendt, emphasises the 
importance of  (systemic) culture(s) shared at the international level 
between states.8 The emphasis on cultures in the plural is important as it 
supposes that it is possible for the international system, or at least 
components of  it, to be transformed by the state actors within the 
system, allowing for more diversity in the international system. This 
opens up space for the possibility of  competing, overlapping, or a the 
very least diverging cultures, shared by varying groups of  states.9 In the 
context of  this thesis, the possibility for competing international cultures 
challenges the implicitness of  Western hegemony. Though the 
international system is assumed to be a largely Western creation, it is 
possible for other actors to renegotiate or transform that system based 
on their interests and ideas.10 With China being a developing actor, the 
question in social constructivist language might read something like: is 
China pushing a competing systemic culture at the international level 
regarding development? As will be shown, the emphasis of  a competing 
(systemic) culture on the international level ultimately does not only 
implicate development alone, but rather a whole catalogue of  issues 
relating to the internal structure of  states, and the structure of  the global 
system more generally. As the argument is developed, it will also be 
shown how culture in the societal sense also carries great importance in 
terms of  intercultural relations, linkages, how international actors 
perceive their interests.11 The incorporation of  societal culture as well, 
challenges some of  the assumptions of  rational scientific analysis.  
 Alexander Wendt's central thesis in his book Social Theory of  International 
Politics is that the meaning of  power and the content of  interests are 
                                                 
7 Peer Schouten, “Theory Talk #27: Christian Reus-Smit on IR Cultures, Re-thinking IR and 
Bridging the Normative-Empirical Divide,” Theory Talks, 2009, http://www.theory- 
talks.org/2009/03/theory-talk-27.html. 
8 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of  International Politics, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is there no non-Western IR theory?,” in Non-
Western international relations theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry 
Buzan (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 1-25. 
11 It will also be posited that similar societal cultures can mutually understand certain 
perspectives, while others prevent mutual comprehension, thus weakening rational scientific 
assumptions about human interaction.  
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largely a function of  ideas.12 This is counter to a more materialist reading 
on power and interests which suggests that they are simply a function of  
either material possession or material aspiration, as they are employed by 
the dominant school of  international relations, (neo)realism. Social 
constructivism, according to Wendt, challenges the causality of  material 
self-interest by asking a simple question: “to what extent do ideas 
constitute those material causes in the first place?”13 With ideas assumed 
as a basis for all social relations, Wendt argues for a social and thus 
ideational basis of  international society.  
 Within an idea-driven world it might be hard to imagine how structure, 
often materially assumed, operates. However, structures are a production 
of  social systems. Wendt describes structure through the notion that 
interests are largely constituted by ideas, thus distributions of  knowledge 
structure social systems.14 This idealist approach to structure, and the 
idea that structures are somehow negotiated in an ideational sense means 
that “the structure of  the contemporary international system contains a 
lot of  culture.”15 When Wendt speaks about culture it is largely referring 
to shared practices which are developed among states in the international 
system.  
 The development of  international structures, negotiated between states, 
is reliant on process. That is how state agents and systemic cultures are 
created, sustained, and sometimes transformed.16  Structures themselves 
rely on what Ashley describes as “accomplishments of  practice.”17 It is 
through repeated interaction that states create international structures, 
thus the concept of  “structural change as cultural change.”18 In looking 
at process in international politics, Wendt treats states as endogenous, or 
internal to process. From a social interactionist perspective, Wendt lays 
out two important aspects of  international social processes. Firstly, an 
evolutionary model of  identity formation demonstrates how identities 
are produced and reproduced through interaction among actors in the 
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13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 189. 
15 Ibid., 190. 
16 Ibid., 313. 
17 Ashley (1988) in Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 314. 
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(international) social process; and secondly, structural change in 
international politics involves 'collective identity formation.'19 Collective 
identity formation emphasises that the creation of  international 
structures (or systemic cultures) is a social process through which states 
form relationships based on common understanding and goals. This can 
include bilateral relations, international regimes, and multilateral 
institutions.  
 The study of  international regimes is especially important here, as they 
too are reliant upon process, and are informal in comparison with 
multilateral institutions. Regimes are “governing arrangements 
constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organise 
aspects of  their behaviour in various issue areas.”20 These also function 
much like the norms and principles that they affirm, in that they function 
in communicative (or, discursive) and constitutive senses.21 In other 
words, regimes play an important role in political discourse, as well as to 
the extent that they represent blocs of  nations with similar (issue-based) 
goals, and usually share some aspect of  history. While the regime 
European Union-African Caribbean and Pacific Group (EU-ACP) 
relations, focusses on achieving solutions to the issue of  development, it 
can also be argued that their linkage is also based on the historical 
relationship shared between many of  the ACP states and former colonial 
powers, now EU member states. The Forum on China Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) is another example of  an international regime to 
be discussed.  
 Within 'cultural selection' Wendt identifies two processes by which 
culture is produced and reproduced: by imitation and through social 
learning. It is the latter, social learning, that is most important for social 
constructivists.  It is posited that through interactions, identities and 
interests are sustained.22 This joint constitution of  identity counters the 
methodological individualism employed by the majority of  international 
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relations scholars, particularly neorealists and neoliberals.23 This also 
challenges the given nature of  identity and interests as social interactionist 
approach emphasises that: “even when the ideas that constitute identities 
and interests are not changing, they are continually reinforced in 
interaction.”24 
 Wendt then presents four master variables leading to collective identity 
formation under (international) anarchy: 'interdependence' (where the 
outcome of  an interaction for each state depends on the choices of  the 
others); 'common fate' (where “individual survival, fitness, or welfare 
depends on what happens to the group as a whole”)25; 'homogeneity' 
(where states have similar corporate identities, including institutional 
form, function, and causal powers or where regime type is similar)26; and 
'self-restraint' (the assurance that sovereign states will treat one another 
with mutual respect and thus have a position of  relative equality and 
trust).27 The last variable is separated from the rest as both self-restraint 
and one of  the first three variables must exist in order for collective 
identity formation to occur.  
 As will be elaborated upon later, the democratic discourse that 
surrounds development is forwarded by relatively homogenous Western 
actors, who then attempt to establish homogeneity with  actors of  the 
global South as a means of  forwarding liberal democracy and neoliberal 
development in unison. A major question for this thesis will be whether 
or not China is attempting to form a new homogenous culture among 
countries of  the global South where their respective aspirations for 
development are not contingent on democratic political forms.28  
 Alexander Wendt's social constructivist theory gives us an important 
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framework through which to analyse states from an ideational 
perspective. The conception that ideas are interests and constitute the 
identities of  international actors challenges us to look at the constitution 
of  these actors for insights into their international behaviour. This 
constitutive approach emphasises that the internal structure of  actors 
very much informs and affects their external outlook and action. The 
idea that structure in the international system is constituted by cultures, 
built by states in a social process points towards the ability of  those 
structures to be transformed, or for new structures to emerge. Collective 
identity formation is also important in thinking about how international 
cultures or structures are formed through ideational processes shared 
between states.  
 The purpose of  this section was to outline how international actors 
establish identities and interests through ideas from a social 
constructivist perspective. The idea that global structures are ideational 
creations, and that they are somehow malleable based on the perspective 
of  those actors who constitute the international system, is an important 
theoretical foundation for this thesis. This is because in looking at the 
political discourse surrounding development in Africa, we are essentially 
looking at the international culture of  development, both as it has been 
formed as a global structure, and how certain aspects of  it are perhaps 
being challenged by the increased presence of  China within the area that 
structure dominates. Viewing the international system as ideational 
processes allows us the ability to focus on the political dimension. 
Though economic and material interests are indeed important, that 
dimension is somewhat removed from the focus of  this thesis. In her 
analysis on Chinese development aid in Africa, Debora Bräutigam 
emphasises how “the political economy of  foreign aid is driven by 
complex interactions among technology, politics, ideology and 
institutions that to a significant extent drive the outcomes of  many 
foreign aid efforts.”29 The approach taken here is to focus more on 
politics and ideology while recognising that technology and institutions 
serve as vehicles of  these more normative or soft political aspects. 
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Indeed, the interest in these dimensions is to the extent that material 
aspects assist in the assertion of  powerful political ideas.  
 
2.3 International Relations as Intercultural Relations30 
 In this thesis, two notions of  'culture' are discussed. A social 
constructivist notion of  'systemic cultures' refers to shared norms and 
dialogue on an international level. This comes close to the concept of  
international regimes, not institutionalised on the level of  international 
organisations, yet still entrenched through repeated interaction, or 
'collective identity formation' among international actors.31 
 This section will argue for the importance of  considering culture on the 
level of  actors in international relations. These actors mostly constitute 
nation states, though not exclusively, as in this thesis we also look at a 
supranational actor, the European Union.  It is befitting the purposes of  
this thesis to look at culture in the ideational sense, where norms are of  
great importance. Here, following Peter Katzenstein, 'culture' “denotes 
collective models of  nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom 
or law.”32 It includes norms and values, “evaluative standards”, as well as 
rules and models “cognitive standards” – these define how social actors 
function in a system.33 Culture can also be understood as something that 
helps in “organising experience” and “guiding the behaviour” of  a 
particular social group.34  In the context of  this essay, this applies broadly 
to respective Chinese and European cultures and more specifically to 
norms and meanings that underlie their respective political development. 
 International relations theory is heavily criticised because it is essentially 
based on assumptions made observing inter-European international life, 
notwithstanding the fact that modern European history does not 
represent quintessential international relations.35 European political 
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culture must not be taken for granted as international political culture 
simply because it is hegemonic. Linked to Eurocentrism and adding to 
the difficulty in addressing culture, are the universalistic assumptions that 
underly social science. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, “universalism 
is the view that there exist scientific truths that are valid across all of  
time and space.”36 From the post-Renaissance period, through the 
Enlightenment until today science has become “the most important 
mode of  knowledge and the arbiter of  social discourse” in European 
culture, it should be emphasised.37 The idea that knowledge derived 
through experimentation is applicable everywhere, is heavily supported 
by the idea of  the (social) scientist as a value-neutral observer. Thus, 
Wallerstein's belief  that this assumption must be broken in order for 
Eurocentrism in social science to be overcome – which is an essential 
process if  we are to aim for global approaches to international life as 
opposed to Eurocentric assumptions cast upon the rest of  the globe.38 
To this end, World History makes a conscious effort at decentralising 
global narratives, cognisant of  the pervasiveness of  Eurocentrism. In 
addition, post-colonial theory identifies and isolates Europe's political 
recipes as “ethno-historical accomplishments limited to the specific 
settings in which they had first appeared.”39 
 An example of  a pervasive universalistic assumption that essentialises 
and overlooks the importance of  culture is the idea that all human 
beings behave according to rational choice, including the assumption of  
individual self-interest. Rational choice assumes that all issues are 
conceived as interests (on an individual level), thus choices can be simply 
calculated – however it is also possible that issues be interpreted in 
relation to beliefs (often accompanied with a sense of  accountability to a 
societal whole), which reduces and complicates choice sets.40 Thus, the 
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importance in understanding that when interests and beliefs are fused, 
rational choice becomes less useful in analysis. We must recognise the 
European genealogy of  rational choice in order to place it firmly as a 
part of  European culture, without assuming that it automatically extends 
further. Simply because European science has developed and operated 
on the basis of  a self-interested version of  human nature does not mean 
that this automatically applies to the whole of  humanity. 
 Especially with the rise of  Southern powers and the shift towards a 
multipolar, regionalist global order, a more global approach requires the 
accounting of  diverse perspectives. This why the flexibility of  social 
constructivism is essential for this thesis, as its analysis focuses on two 
culturally different international actors, and their respective development 
policies towards a region, sub-Saharan Africa, where political culture 
oscillates between embedded Westernisation of  the colonial period and 
the search for African authenticity in the post-colonial present.41 
Furthermore, with the incorporation of  culture on the actor level in the 
theoretical framework of  this thesis, we can better assess the differences 
between China and the EU, and their respective political cultures and 
conceptions of  global order, both of  which inform their views on 
development. 
 It is important to account for the role of  culture and values in any given 
country's foreign policy.42 This applies not simply to advocacy of  
political values, but more fundamentally to the meaning and construction 
of  interests that emerge from culture, values and self-understanding, 
among other things. While theoretical approaches such as rational choice 
(including realism) and Marxism avoid culture, we must not forget that 
culture is essential to the political.43 A look at culture and values can help 
in understanding a diverse array of  actors and how these also 
incorporate certain social principles or normative guidelines on how 
                                                 
41 Adda Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, Second. (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1994), xvii. For more on African postcolonial struggles with Westernisation, and 
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power should be exercised.44 Bozeman emphasises that, in determining 
what one can expect from a state and society, one must identify its 
cultural infrastructure.45 
 
 What will now be introduced is a brief, but important theory that will 
help in differentiating between what kind of  'social solidarities' cultures 
tend towards. This theory is 'constrained relativism', which brings 
together “cultural biases, patterns of  social relations and behavioural 
strategies as a form of  social solidarity” and attempts to “distinguish 
similarities and differences across cultures in terms of  a small number of  
universally valid forms of  social solidarity.”46 These four basic forms of  
social solidarity are: fatalism, individualism, egalitarianism, and hierarchy. 
Fatalistic and individualistic cultures are characterised by 
unaccountability, and unfettered competition while egalitarian and 
hierarchical are characteristed by accountability and fettered competition. 
This provides for a basic framework, free of  value judgements, through 
which to analyse fundamental characteristics of  different cultural 
structures. Émile Durkheim emphasised the importance of  beliefs and 
values as “essential components of  economic, ecological, demographic, 
organisational and political explanations.”47 Constrained relativism helps 
in accounting for important structural aspects of  culture, its impact on 
policy and potentially, compatibility in cross-cultural interactions.  
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Figure 1 “The proper typology according to the theory of  constrained relativism”48 
 
Important structural questions about culture can be at least partly 
addressed through the above typology. One such example is the differing 
emphases on rights in Europe and China, where in the former individual 
rights are emphasised, while in the latter communitarian rights are held 
in greatest importance.49 European culture tends towards individualism, 
where people are relatively unaccountable to one another, and where the 
emphasis on the individual has led to the safeguarding of  individual 
rights by the state. Chinese culture tends towards hierarchy, with 
accountability reinforced through the family, and where the interests of  
the society (and therefore the state) come before those of  the individual.  
 An emphasis on culture will help this thesis in having a more nuanced 
understanding of  the different environments in which Chinese and 
European development policy originate, as well as the African 
environment for which they have been envisioned. With consideration to 
culture, we must overcome basic assumptions about political structure 
and interests. A great example to this effect is offered by Pye, where he 
observes “Chinese politics are not about left vs. right, but about conflicts 
in institutional hierarchy.”50 Even the realm of  ideological competition, 
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central to Western liberal democratic political systems, cannot be simply 
assumed. Now that an approach that incorporates culture has been 
established, soft power will be discussed. 
 
2.4 Soft Power, Norms, Hegemony and Discourse 
 An important concept in looking at the spread of  norms globally is that 
of  'soft power.' Coined by Joseph S. Nye, soft power is: “the ability to 
affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather 
than coercion or payment” that relies on “resources of  culture, values 
and policies.”51 This is differentiated from hard power which often uses 
military power or other forms of  coercion. Soft power is important for 
us here as it underlies the use of  political norms which are tied to the 
resources of  culture, values and policies. Soft power is an important 
concept not only theoretically, it also forms an important part of  foreign 
policy self-perception for both the People's Republic of  China and the 
European Union. 
 In discussing differing notions of  soft power in international relations, 
this section will begin by looking at theories related to the normative 
power of  the European Union, including 'civilian power',  'soft 
imperialism' and 'Normative Power Europe.' The theory of  'soft use of  
power', emerging out of  the Chinese soft power literature, will then be 
discussed. Finally we will look at more philosophical perspectives on 
discourse, power and (cultural) hegemony.  
 In light of  the previous section on culture, it is important to remember 
that norms and culture are intertwined, thus the spread of  one entails 
the spread of  the other. Though European political norms make 
universalistic claims, and despite being the basis of  much of  the current 
international system, they have still been developed in a culturally-
specific context. From a social constructivist perspective, the system is 
malleable, thus the prevalence of  European thinking within it, does not 
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mean that other systemic cultures cannot emerge, especially as we head 
towards a multipolar world.  
 
 Fredrik Söderbaum and Björn Hettne identify two ways in which the 
European Union acts as a global actor: through civilian power and soft 
imperialism, respectively. 'Civilian power' emphasises the promotion of  
norms through “voluntary dialogue and consensus-building” with 
various international counterparts.52 This is the case, especially when the 
EU and respective regional counterparts are relatively equal in terms of  
perceived power. Such relative equals include ASEM, the Asia-Europe 
Meeting and MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market of  South 
America.53 
 'Soft imperialism', on the other hand, represents an uneven or 
asymmetric relationship which includes the imposition of  norms and 
conditionalities.54 Thus, it can be seen as “soft power applied in a hard 
way” where self-interest (on the part of  the EU, or other imposing 
power) trumps genuine dialogue. This exists with weaker counterparts, 
including sub-Saharan African regions within the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of  States (ACP) inter-regional framework. Because the 
imposition of  norms entails the imposition of  culture, it is possible to 
think of  soft imperialism as bordering on cultural imperialism, 
something that will be discussed along with the soft use of  power 
approach. 
 Both civilian power and soft imperialism are important in different ways. 
Through interregional dialogues including (economically powerful) 
China, and East Asia more generally (ASEM), the EU focusses itself  
more on the economic dimension while restraining important political 
norms such as democracy, good governance, and the rule of  law.55 Thus, 
inasmuch as China is concerned, a civilian power approach is taken, 
where the EU has a stance reflecting a dialogue of  equals, with minimal 
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imposition of  European cultural norms and values. In terms of  the EU's 
relations, both bilateral and regional with sub-Saharan Africa (within the 
ACP framework), the approach tends much more to the imposition of  
political norms, often tied to economic and development agreements.56 
Here soft imperialism tells us more of  the story and gives a theoretical 
framework through which to analyse the EU's development relations 
with Africa, indeed towards the end of  testing whether those uneven 
relations may be challenged in some way by increased Chinese 
involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa. Söderbaum and Hettne emphasise 
that while the option of  civilian power is always available to the EU in its 
external relations, soft imperialism relies on a stable relative power 
position of  the EU vis-à-vis its counterpart (in this case, sub-Saharan 
Africa).57 The question of  Chinese impact on EU development policy in 
Africa can thus be framed by asking whether the promotion of  a 
different and possibly competing set of  norms surrounding 
development, backed by real economic (investment and infrastructure) 
power, may jeopardize the EU's soft imperialist position in imposing its 
political norms regarding development on sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
 Ian Manners' Normative Power Europe thesis is another important 
approach to analysing the ability of  the European Union to propagate its 
universal values globally. The EU's international role is informed by its 
internally constructed identity, formed by core and minor norms which 
thus form an essential part of  its normative power globally.58 This 
conforms with Wendt and Lancaster's respective ideas on how internal 
political identity/structure affect external priorities more generally, and 
development policy more specifically.59 Manners argues that the EU's 
status as a unique actor in international relations is informed by a 
normative difference coming from its “historical context, hybrid polity, 
and political-legal constitution.”60 Indeed, Buzan and Little assert that the 
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EU represents “a new type of  entity with actor quality” which “is 
experimenting with a new form of  both unit and subsystem structure.”61 
The constitutive nature of  the EU informs how it acts both between and 
beyond the member states. Manners identifies five core norms forming 
the EU's normative basis: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of  law, and 
respect for human rights; Complemented by four minor norms: social 
solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good 
governance.62 These are the fundaments of  the creation of  this Union of  
nation states, its expansion, and indeed its foreign relations. As will be 
analysed in the chapter on European Union and Development 
Hegemony, these norms form core European cultural norms and are 
extremely important in EU development policy, notably democracy, the 
rule of  law, and good governance, as well as political and civil human 
rights. 
 Manners identifies several important processes through which EU 
norms are diffused globally. The most important for us are 
'informational diffusion', influence through strategic and declaratory 
communications; 'procedural diffusion', institutionalisation of  a 
relationship between the EU and a third party; 'transference', exchange 
of  goods, trade, aid or technology which assist the exportation of  EU 
norms, often through conditionalities; and 'cultural filter', where EU 
efforts on pushing international norms cause political learning “in third 
states leading to learning, adaptation, or rejection of  norms.”63 These 
processes of  norm diffusion are important in terms of  assessing EU soft 
power influence on discourses of  development and on African states.  
 
 Li Mingjiang attempts to reconceptualise Nye's concept of  soft power, 
by focusing more on how a state uses all of  its resources of  power, 
instead of  focusing on soft power resources themselves. Li proposes a 
'soft use of  power' theory which involves the  “prudent use of  all 
sources of  power available in certain social relationships.”64 This theory 
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also breaks the boundary between domestic and international politics as 
it emphasises “domestic political values, institutions, and political system 
are important considerations for a states' soft power.”65 While culture is 
accounted for as a material factor in Nye's theory, Li recognises how 
China's soft power is intertwined with its culture. That is to say that 
cultural factors including political values and priorities as well as 
traditions are all important in understanding Chinese foreign policy and 
strategy.66 
 Li's emphasis on prudence is itself  based on China's approach to 
external relations, as will be examined in much more depth in the China 
chapter, which will address culture and development policy. It is 
emphasised that if  all resources of  power are used “in a prudent, 
cautious, accommodating and considerate approach” positive reciprocity 
from other states will follow.67 The recognition by the Chinese leadership 
of  the importance of  soft power reflects the reality that “tangible 
military and economic power along is no longer sufficient for a nation to 
project its might in international affairs.”68 
 Western dominance of  “discourse, institutions, and rules” in 
international relations meant that the theory of  soft power was initially 
developed as a Western concept.69 To widen the applicability of  soft 
power, culture must not be treated simply as a resource of  soft power, 
but as integral to the construction of  the soft use of  power, just as it is 
integral to the construction of  the actor itself. China's cultural and 
historical background includes norms and values compatible with soft 
power.70 Such concepts include the Golden Mean (balance in the 
universe, respect for difference, achieving mutually acceptable 
agreements) in social relations which leads to one of  the most important 
of  Confucian goals: harmony.71 While these are not-issue based, nor are 
they ideological, as will be demonstrated in the chapter on China, these 
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and other Chinese cultural, traditional and philosophical norms are 
integral not only to its soft power, but into its foreign policy as a whole.72 
 In his Prison Notebooks, Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci lays out 
the notion that elites  “for reasons of  submission and intellectual 
subordination” impose a conception of  the world upon the masses that 
is not of  their own making.73 In a societal context, this entails hegemony. 
Robert W. Cox applies Gramsci's conception of  hegemony to the 
interpretation of  international order. Cox first links world hegemony 
with the outward expansion of  hegemonic domestic social orders, 
encompassing social, economic, and political structures.74 “World 
hegemony... is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms 
which lay down general rules of  behaviour for states and for those forces 
of  civil society that act across national boundaries...”75 His concept of  
world orders, “the particular configurations of  forces which successively 
define the problematic of  war and peace for the ensemble of  states” is 
also important, as hegemony represents “a coherent conjunction or fit 
between a configuration of  material power, the prevalent collective 
image of  the world order (including certain norms) and a set of  
institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of  
universality.”76 Cox argues that international institutions play a vital role 
in legitimating domestic institutions and practices, in line with the 
interests of  the hegemonic order. This is essential, as the hegemonic 
development discourse, operationalised by the European Union, is also 
forwarded by such international institutions as the International 
Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, among others.   
 
 From hegemony, we now shift to knowledge and power as they relate to 
discourse. Power relations within discourses are an important subject in 
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the work of  Michel Foucault. Foucault's relevant ideas, applicable to our 
investigation on norms and hegemony in international relations, are 
especially outlined in his work Power/Knowledge. 'Power', according to 
Foucault, is implemented through the production, accumulation, 
circulation and functioning of  a coherent discourse.77 This discourse, and 
thus the power it engenders, exists not as a localised phenomenon, but 
rather as a discursive chain. The applicability of  these ideas to normative 
discourse is thus apparent. Foucault emphasises the “ascent of  power 
that is tied to scientific knowledges” and thus how disciplines themselves 
represent apparatuses of  knowledge, restricted, and unevenly powerful.78 
Discourses are identified as ideological productions, where major 
mechanisms of  power eventually promote the propagation of  norms. 
More specifically referred by Foucault as a 'society of  normalisation', this 
concept bears great importance for the hegemonic development 
discourse, and also to the overall spreading of  norms by global actors 
such as the EU.79  
 Powerful discourses build upon themselves. Thus, the idea of  'regimes of  
truth' is important when applying Foucault's ideas in the international 
political realm, as only ideas and norms that adhere to these regimes 
carry with them political legitimacy. It follows that Foucault calls for the 
insurrection of  “subjugated knowledges”, that is, knowledges that 
somehow lie beneath a required level of  legitimacy, and whose historical 
contents are buried and disguised.80 Thus, 'archaeology' as a 
methodology for analysis of  subordinate discourses, and 'genealogy' as a 
tactic for releasing subjected knowledges, is advocated.81 Especially 
important here is Foucault's elaboration on his conception of  'genealogy'  
measures the claims to attention of  local, discontinuous, disqualified, 
illegitimate knowledges against the claims of  a unitary body of  theory 
which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of  some true 
knowledge and some arbitrary idea of  what constitutes a science and its 
objects.82 
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Essentially what Foucault is advocating is a disposition, and a 
methodology, that refuses to trivialise the importance of  knowledge 
coming from outside hegemonic discourses (or regimes of  truth).  This 
is a practical end to the philosophical realisation of  “the centralising 
powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of  an 
organised scientific discourse.”83 These ideas are especially important for 
this thesis as we are dealing with an aspect of  international political 
culture, the development discourse, which carries with it norms that are 
central to its legitimacy. It is often through discourse that these norms 
are reinforced and thus when thinking of  the exchange of  political ideas 
surrounding development between global actors such as the EU and 
China, we can reflect upon the discursive power relations that exist 
within that relationship. This is especially important in the context of  
development, which has largely been a conception of  the West. As we 
will investigate in the next chapter on the EU and the hegemonic 
development discourse, this regime of  truth relies on political norms 
that are forwarded by the West, and to varying degrees, contested in the 
developing world.  
 
2.5 Synthesis 
 In this chapter it has been addressed, how international actors at their 
core can be analysed as 'ideational' in nature. This can be achieved 
through social constructivist analysis. Building upon how interests are 
ideas, norms emerge as an important part of  respective actors' foreign 
policies and play an important part in the conception of  cultures within 
the international system. This concept of  different 'systemic cultures' is 
important as it emphasises that the structures of  the international system 
can indeed be dynamic, thus they are contestable, and they can indeed be 
transformed. The importance of  ideas and norms within the global 
system has been addressed generally. Furthermore that centrality of  
norms has been discussed as a key component of  the global discourse 
around development, which can be defined by the dominant or 
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hegemonic Western culture that defines this aspect of  the international 
system.  
 The hegemony of  Western culture within the world order and within the 
development discourse that is an extension thereof, presents the 
importance in adding culture to this theoretical framework. An emphasis 
on culture also enables us to view international relations on the basis of  
more complex social interactions, where diverse conceptions of  the 
political collective, interests, world order and even ideology emphasise 
international relations as being intercultural relations.84 To the end of  
understanding differing social solidarities in diverse political cultural 
spheres, constrained relativism helps in portraying fundamental 
distinctions between culture that affect the societal whole. As 
development policy is an extension of  domestic politics, these cultural 
distinctions prove important for the study of  global political discourse in 
a multipolar world. Building upon the conception that political actors are 
socially constructed, cultural norms and meanings help in understanding 
the construction of  foreign policy generally, and development policy 
more particularly. The cultural lens provides a powerful antidote to 
Eurocentrism in international relations and universalism in social science 
more generally. It is also in keeping with the aims of  postcolonial studies 
and of  world history in contextualising the European experience, and 
opening up space for historical and political narratives beyond Europe, 
and indeed beyond the hegemonic liberal international order.  
 The division of  the section of  soft power between European and 
Chinese approaches demonstrates the importance of  the political actor 
in applying theory. For the European Union soft power demonstrates the 
complexity of  the spread of  norms in international relations, and the 
importance of  relative power in discerning to what extent those norms 
are proliferated coercively, or through consent. Norms can be spread 
rather coercively within the context of  an uneven power relation, i.e. 
'soft imperialism', whereas in the context of  relatively even power 
relations a 'civilian power' approach is used. Both contexts are important 
in terms of  understanding the European Union's civilian power vis-à-vis 
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the European Union versus its soft imperialism towards sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 The importance of  culture is again emphasised with the soft use of  
power approach which more reflects Chinese foreign policy. This allows 
for the emphasis of  norms and traditions in social relations as having an 
important impact on how foreign and development policies are 
formulated and exerted. Whereas political ideals arguably have the 
greatest impact on European normative priorities, as will be 
demonstrated in the China chapter, as Chinese political culture moves 
beyond ideology, priorities such as peace and harmony are not basic 
foreign policy goals, they are an extension of  Chinese cultural values that 
also correspond well with the notion of  soft power. The soft use of  
power approach is important as it assesses an international actors' soft 
power based on more than simply the soft power materials or assets they 
possess. Soft use of  power is about how, on the whole, power is used in 
a prudent way in social relationships.  
 Hegemony is an important concept for this thesis as it entails that 
general rules and behaviours (read norms) are laid out through means 
including global institutions, shaped by the dominant world order. As the 
European Union forms a part of  that dominant order, and as its 
development policy is also part and parcel of  that order, this concept is 
crucial in understanding the context within which China conducts its 
foreign relations in Africa. This is where regimes of  truth are also 
important, as they are formed of  self-legitimating discourses created by 
the powerful. As China's conception of  global order is contrasted with 
the European Union's, it is important to recognise from the outset the 
uneven (political) power relation as the EU forms a part of  the 
hegemonic global order more generally, and the hegemonic development 
discourse more specifically. 
 The ideas discussed throughout this theoretical section will be applied to 
both actors in assessing their relative soft power, the norms and 
conceptions of  world order that they seek to promote, emphasising that 
they are socially constructed actors, and that culture matters in 
understanding their respective societal and therefore development 
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Chapter Three: Western Hegemony and EU 
Development Policy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 The European Union as a normative power was discussed in the first 
chapter. An explicit goal of  the EU is to spread democratic political 
norms globally, as well as to encourage regional integration based on 
democratic norms and free market-based economic development. One 
of  the key factors to effective normative power for the EU is having a 
coherent discourse. As far as development is concerned, there is a 
relatively high level of  consensus among the 27 member countries vis-à-
vis other policy areas. This section will discuss the EU's political goals 
through its development assistance policy towards Africa. Its 
development policy will be shown to be consistent with the 'hegemonic' 
development discourse as established by Western liberal democratic 
countries and international financial institutions.  
 The chapter will begin by discussing what exactly constitutes the 
'hegemonic development discourse', as largely stated by scholars of  post-
development. This has influenced the attachment of  political and 
economic conditionalities to development aid and assistance emanating 
from Western countries and international financial institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). The 
strong influence of  neoliberal economic ideas in the contemporary 
development establishment, as well as the extension of  democratic 
institutions to the global South, will be discussed.   
 After defining the 'hegemonic' development discourse, EU development 
policies will then be discussed, especially towards determining the extent 
to which they themselves are consistent with the contemporary 
development establishment. This section will also be important in 
highlighting the EU's most important political goals through its 
development relations with sub-Saharan African countries. The EU's 
priories will be determined in the areas of  political conditionalities, and 
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regional integration, which largely focuses on economic liberalisation. 
Ultimately, demonstrating the EU's development priorities in sub-
Saharan Africa will provide the basis for assessing the extent to which 
China's increasing involvement affects the EU's goals on the political 
level. 
 
3.2 Development Hegemony 
 It is in the context of  ideas of  (cultural) hegemony from Gramsci and of  
regimes of  truth from Foucault that the 'hegemonic development 
discourse' will now be discussed. The European Union resides within the 
hegemonic world order, and the ideas that form the basis of  European 
(liberal democratic) nation states are further legitimised by global 
institutions and standards produced by the West more broadly. This 
represents a continuation of  Western imperialism in discursive and 
institutional senses. A major part of  this world order is the propagation 
Western universalist cultural norms, which are also furthered by the 
European Union. Political ideologies emerging out of  Western cultural 
priorities will then be discussed as a means of  fully establishing what is 
meant here by 'development hegemony'.  
 It is essential to discuss 'development hegemony' at the outset of  the 
thesis for several reasons. Firstly, the assessment on China's impact on 
political discourse concerning development requires first an 
understanding of  the norms forwarded by the present dominant 
discourse. Secondly, it will be argued that the hegemonic development 
discourse essentially amounts to the 'gospel' of  Western, liberal 
democratic nations. By 'gospel' I mean that this discourse contains within 
it the essential features that Western political culture seeks to proliferate, 
if  not impose, on the world at large both discursively and institutionally. 
Thus, the norms advocated in this discourse provide a view not only on 
the domestic politics of  Europe, they also shed light on the universalist 
cultural priorities of  the continent, and of  the West.  
 The hegemonic development discourse more broadly reflects the 
approach to development as advocated by the 'traditional donors' in sub-
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Saharan Africa.85 These donors, all possessing liberal democratic political 
systems, define the norms, institutions and legitimate political discourse 
of  the present world order. Thus, this chapter will take on perspectives 
from the post-development school, whose criticism of  the so-called 
development discourse has revealed the kind of  power relations that 
exist in the production of  knowledge that informs development policy. 
This is evident in that the 'legitimate' liberal (democratic) international 
norms forwarded by the hegemonic world order often form the basis of  
the externalisation of  responsibility for development-related policies. 
This is an application of  Foucault's 'regimes of  truth' concept discussed 
above, with the an example being the EU justifying a move towards 
neoliberal trade policy based on the policies of  a 'legitimate' international 
organisation (e.g. the World Trade Organisation).86 It is the regime of  
truth around development that will now be discussed, with emphasis on 
the EU's integral role within that regime.  
 
 Core European (Union) norms were discussed in the theoretical chapter 
(Chapter 2), which Manners identifies as peace, liberty, democracy, rule 
of  law, and respect for human rights. With minor norms including: social 
solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good 
governance.87 These are not important only in European sense, they are 
also viewed as applicable to the world at large. This equates universalism 
on the part of  European development policy, and that of  the West more 
broadly.  
 The reconfiguration of  European culture beginning with the 
Renaissance, through the Enlightenment was characterised by the 
removal of  a traditional, feudalistic, religious, collective past towards a 
modern, democratic, secular and individualistic future. The French 
Revolution was a major break with the past, as it signalled the abolition 
of  more collective conceptions of  rights for a more individual 
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conception.88 The values of  modern, secular Europe, conceived for the 
world at large, were the Liberty, Equality and Fraternity of  the French 
Revolution. These are exemplified today as democracy, social equality, 
and humanist universalism.89 Such values are considered to be modern, 
with modernity itself  originating in the West.90 
 Therefore, histories of  Eurocentrism, universalism, and the propagation 
of  a Western, modern vision for the world are strongly linked to the 
concomitant growth of  capitalism in Europe and its expansionist push 
resulting in colonialism.91  Europe's conception of  modernity was 
pushed forward by scientific progress and its service to productivity, to 
the creation of  a secular society, encompassing aspiration for 
democracy.92 Samir Amin argues that capitalism had an objective need 
for a scientific explanation of  evolution of  all human societies as well as 
being a project for the future of  all of  humanity.93  
 The West's self-perception was of  possessing a political, economic and 
social model to be imitated by all, especially in adopting its “miracle 
recipe” of  the market and democracy.94 This led to the idea of  
'Eurocentric developmentalism' with Europe at the centre of  the 'myth 
of  modernity' where “European civilisation understands itself  as the 
most developed, the superior civilisation... [this] sense of  superiority 
obliges it.. to 'develop'... underdeveloped civilisations.”95 Thus, Europe's 
self  perception as the most advanced culture, with its underlying 
universalistic tendencies, helped push for the propagation of  European 
norms, values, institutions and behaviours worldwide. Blaut refers to 
Eurocentrism as “the coloniser's model of  the world” which constitutes 
a “super theory” for what societies should look like worldwide.96 An 
interrelated concept is 'Eurocentric diffusionism', which assumes that 
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“Europe naturally progresses and modernises” while “Non-Europe 
naturally remains stagnant, unchanging, traditional, and backward.”97 
Accordingly, European models must be exported in order to further the 
project of  modernity.98 
 The 'developmentalist' and 'diffusionist' tendencies of  European 
culture, with universalistic cultural norms, have manifested themselves 
since the second half  of  the 20th Century in processes of  
'modernisation'. This approach covers a broad spectrum of  
transformations: social, cultural, economic and political: 
[modernisation] stressed as 'normal' the interrelatedness between, for 
example, the emergence of  capitalism, industrialisation, the rise of  
liberal democratic structures, the building of  the nation state, the 
emergence of  pluralist society and social relations built on achievement, 
the advancement of  science, certain personality structures, certain belief  
systems and states of  mind.99 
Thus, modernisation can be viewed as a later justification for the 
proliferation of  European cultural norms worldwide. It is important to 
specify the European origin of  notions of  modernity, tied with 
individualism, liberal democracy, and capitalism because it is precisely 
due to Eurocentrism that these conditions are assumed to be applicable 
to the world at large. In essence, this attempt to universalise the 
European experience denies other regions their right to cultural 
specificity. This again reflects the Western tendency towards cultural 
imperialism, due to the self-perception of  Europe and the West at large 
as being the most developed societies, for all to emulate, and imitate in 
order to achieve a similar status. Next under discussion will be important 
concepts of  the hegemonic development discourse emerging out of  
European culture: good governance, neoliberalism, and the nation-state. 
Good governance ties into Eurocentric socio-political priorities, while 
neoliberalism more addresses politico-economic priorities, all of  which 
should be contained within the structures of  the modern nation-state, 
also developed in Europe.  
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 The pervasiveness of  neoliberalism in development policy is a 
phenomenon that has been well-documented since the 1980s.100 
Neoliberalism forms a hegemonic ideology in the broader international 
political economy. That very international political economy drives the 
ideas behind development. Neoliberalism has become so mainstream 
that within development, the adoption of  neoliberal policies equates 
economic development, and demonstrating that within 'development 
hegemony' the western-created consensus on development focusses 
mostly on economic development.  
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of  political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade. The role of  the state is to create and 
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.101 
Within this ideological turn, governments are encouraged to remove 
themselves as much as possible from direct intervention in the economy, 
rather taking on a new role as arbiters of  the market. This reduced role, 
furthered by the privatisation of  state-owned enterprises, leads to a 
lessened role for the state both commercially and in terms of  social 
provision, while focussing on an increased role in guaranteeing such 
things as private property rights, and “the quality and integrity of  
money.”102 State capacity in ensuring private property rights, as well as 
the kind of  stable environment that encourages foreign direct investment 
(FDI), includes strong legal structures, as well as strengthened security 
through military and police forces.103 
 The advocacy of  neoliberalism in the context of  development forms a 
major part of  the so-called 'Washington Consensus'. This promoted 
market-led as opposed to state-led development through government 
inflation control and deficit reduction; liberalisation of  the national 
market to trade and capital; and the privatisation and deregulation of  the 
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domestic market.104 The failure of  the implementation of  these ideas 
through structural adjustment policies in sub-Saharan Africa, forced for a 
reconceptualisation of  the Washington Consensus. Joseph Stiglitz, then 
Vice President and Chief  Economist of  the World Bank proposed a 
post-Washington Consensus where “the state has an important role to 
play in appropriate regulation, industrial policy, social protection and 
welfare.”105 The return of  focus on the state in the hegemonic 
development discourse would especially emphasise the regulatory role of  
the state, also emphasising other capacities, under the auspices of  'good 
governance'.  
 
 Centrepieces of  EU development policy have been the interrelated 
political, good governance aspect, as well as the advocacy of  neoliberal 
economic policies. The dominant concept of  good governance can be 
defined as a technocratic approach aiming for “efficiency, authority and 
accountability of  the state” through “enhancing a sound economic 
climate, transparency and the rule of  law, and tackling corruption are 
considered the most important mechanisms.”106 This political reform is 
aimed principally at creating a favourable economic environment, while 
human rights are protected by a strengthened legal system. However, the 
first function of  the legal system in this model is to protect private 
property rights in order to defend the neoliberal economic policies that 
will be discussed below. There is a clear interrelation between 
neoliberalism and good governance, as advocated by the traditional 
development donors. As good governance relates to the rule of  law, 
limiting corruption, and creating a regulatory state capable of  facilitating 
a mostly private market, its goals are very much intertwined with the free 
market capitalistic aims of  neoliberalism.  Indeed, “good governance 
means a democratic capitalist regime, presided over by a minimal state 
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which is also part of  the wider governance of  the New World Order”.107 
 
 Post-development theorists refer to the hegemonic situation of  western 
political and academic knowledge as a key component of  the so-called 
'development apparatus'.108 The nation-state is also a central concept in 
the West, which is reinforced by the involvement of  the most developed 
forms of  nation states in the development of  the global South. The 
strength of  each nation-state in this world remains as the highest 
indicator for a society's performance, and ultimately its integration into 
globalisation. The search for centrality and legitimacy in the modern 
world both begins and ends with the creation of  a mono-cultural form: a 
nation-state.109 Firstly, as outlined by Max Weber, a 'nation-state' is an 
entity which has the monopoly on violence within a particular territory. 
“exclusive political authority exercised...over a given territory.”110 These 
were the original criteria for the Westphalian nation-state, as defined by 
the Treaty of  Westphalia, signed in 1648. The nation-state concept has 
become much more complex than these basic components, as it has 
developed alongside liberal democracy to include representative 
democracy, strong institutions from legal and political affairs, to the 
economy, and social welfare. While the nation-state has been in concert 
with various forms of  capitalist economy, that advocated in the context 
of  development today is more laissez-faire, or neoliberal.111  
 Though it was only really implemented in Europe in the 19th Century, 
and throughout the global South through the imposition of  the colonial 
state, the Western-style nation-state has managed to suppress virtually all 
other forms of  political organisation, especially in the realm of  
legitimacy. This is part of  what Ashis Nandy terms: “Colonization of  the 
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Mind.”112 Especially during 19th Century colonising missions, buttressed 
by rational-scientific Enlightenment liberalism, traditional values were 
swept away by universalism as it was applied to political organisation.113 
This kind of  thinking persists until today, where traditional life is 
assumed to be static, and modern to be dynamic.  This kind of  trajectory 
which, reflective of  a modern European cultural perspective, imagining a 
logical, progressive path: “from poverty, barbarianism, despotism, and 
ignorance to riches, civilization, democracy and rationality, the highest 
expression of  which is science.”114 The nation-state, scientific thinking, 
and the market “have been the great universalizing powers” delivering 
Western structures and decimating traditional systems.115 
 
 The concept of  the nation-state, and the neoliberal and good 
governance ideas that apply to it, has always been quintessentially 
Western. The Westphalian nation state's structures emerged out of  a 
chaotic period in Europe's history, with liberal democratic norms and the 
concomitant growth of  capitalism as key factors in the development of  
the nation-state. This kind of  approach demonstrates that political 
systems are intertwined with society and culture, and have developed as 
such. As the concept of  the nation-state is a function of  Western culture, 
it is often this concept that gives way to culture in the developing 
world.116 Often the incompatibility of  Western development policies is 
imperceptible, because Western conceptions of  political organisation are 
so deeply embedded in the development discourse. Concepts such as 
neoliberal economics and the liberal democratic political system, 
furthered by good governance, are not questionable within the 
development discourse, despite many failures in their application in the 
global South. The unquestioned nature of  these ideas reflects what I 
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have termed, 'development hegemony'.  
 The use and often imposition of  political norms, values and institutions 
related to neoliberalism and good governance within the structure of  the 
nation-state therefore demonstrate the dominance of  the West in 
development and within the world order more generally. Core concepts 
associated with European modernity are spread with the justification that 
they are universally applicable. These concepts include   individualism 
and individual rights, liberal democracy, secularism and capitalist 
economy. These norms have been historically spread through European 
colonialism, and more recent processes of  modernisation and they 
continue to be spread through the hegemonic development discourse. 
These Eurocentric conceptions of  society have central legitimacy in the 
hegemonic world order, and as they correspond with the European 
Union's foreign and development policy goals, the EU can be safely 
placed within the hegemonic development discourse.  
 
3.3 History of  EU as a Development Actor in Africa  
 The European Union's involvement in development in Africa dates back 
to its predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC) with the 
Yaoundé Conventions in 1963. The EEC would engage in more 
substantial cooperation through the Lomé Conventions, beginning in 
1975 roughly until the formation of  the EU with the Maastricht Treaty 
of  1992. The Lomé Conventions were central to the EU's development 
partnership with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of  States 
(ACP). Originally, the focus was economic partnership, but as the 
international development paradigm and the Union itself  became more 
politicised, so too did the relations between the erstwhile EEC and the 
developing ACP countries. 
 Africa has long been considered to be within Europe's sphere of  
influence, especially as the postcolonial period has been characterised by 
the continued involvement of  former colonisers such as Britain and 
especially France. During the Cold War, the United States considered 
47 
Africa to be a 'special European responsibility'.117 Despite the fact that 
powerful members of  the then EEC had recently left the continent as 
colonisers mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, the EEC considered itself  to 
be exceptional: “The European Community is young, it has no past.”118 
Though the statement itself  is controversial, it goes far in demonstrating 
the self-perception of  the EEC and now the EU, as a sui generis (unique) 
political formation, and one which offers itself  an historical blank slate, 
despite the troubling past of  colonialism. Suffice to say, that this 
perspective is interesting in from a postcolonial viewpoint.  
 Beginning with the first Lomé Convention in 1975 the EEC thus sought 
to focus on forming economic partnerships with the world's least 
developed regions, the ACP, as a means of  boosting their development 
prospects largely through preferential trade, as well as development aid 
and investment. Towards the end of  the 1970s, a more liberal 
understanding of  development began to shape the EEC's approach.119 
This change in economic policy coincided with the same neoliberal shift 
in global economic thinking that would see Deng Xiaoping open China's 
market to (restrained) capitalism, with this period also seeing Margaret 
Thatcher's dramatic scaling back of  the welfare state in the United 
Kingdom.120 The neoliberal turn emphasises free market capitalism as a 
means in itself  to development, counter to the previous Keynesian, 
protectionist, or developmental state theories. 
 Towards the end of  the Lomé Conventions, with the Cold War over, the 
(now) European Union (EU) began to push for more of  an emphasis on 
“political dialogue and effective management of  aid”.121 This was also 
due to a change in the global development discourse which began to see 
democracy and human rights as pre-conditions for development. These 
were previously viewed as “outcome[s] of  a successful social and 
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economic modernisation process.”122 A new emphasis on political 
conditionalities and not simply economic relations is also related to the 
adoption of  the Maastricht (Union) Treaty in 1992, as these 
conditionalities became a core policy instrument of  EU development 
policy, now part of  the Union's common legal basis.123   
 The significant development involvement that was characterised by the 
Lomé Conventions would continue into the new millennium with the 
signing of  the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP nations in 2000.  The 
agreement explicitly attached political conditionalities to the EU's 
relations with the ACP. Good governance, as one of  the EU's essential 
conditionalities, proved difficult to include in Cotonou due to resistance 
from the ACP side, though eventually it was included as a fundamental 
element of  that agreement, with revoking of  aid as a possible 
consequence for failing to meet good governance standards set out by 
the international community.124 It is argued that in the post-Cold War 
world, along with declining EU economic and strategic interest in ACP 
countries, and Africa in particular: “the promotion of  values and norms 
in the European-African relationship has become more important.”125 
The inclusion of  political conditionalities is reflective importance of  
norms and values in EU development policy, and also validates Hettne 
and Söderbaum's notion that soft imperialism exists in Europe's relations 
with the ACP. That it to say that there is an uneven power balance, where 
the EU imposes its political norms on its ACP partners. 
 Though the Cotonou Agreement saw the official politicisation of  the 
provision of  aid, the agreement still had a fundamentally economic 
thrust. While Lomé had arranged for preferential trade agreements with 
developing countries, these arrangements were found to be in 
contravention of  World Trade Organisation regulations. Thus, with 
Cotonou, the EU restructured trade relations by entering into 
negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements, with the intent to 
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establish interregional Free Trade Agreements with the various regional 
constellations within the ACP. This shift is in keeping with the 
dominance of  neoliberal economic ideas, and their fusion with 
development policy, in the post-Cold War era.126 
 Despite low economic interest in sub-Saharan Africa (relative to China's 
increasing stake), the region remains important to the development of  
the EU as a global actor.127 Economic and political relationships related 
to development are not the only areas of  strategic importance for the 
EU in Africa. Also, in the development of  the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Africa has also been important as a region where the 
EU's greater Foreign Policy role can be developed in practice.128  
 
3.4 EU Institutions and Policy 
 European Union institutions have been strengthened since the 
Maastricht Treaty of  1992 which integrated development policy into the 
Union's common legal basis.129 Various of  the EU's signed development 
agreements have been mentioned such as the former Lomé Conventions, 
succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement. The EU institution responsible 
for the aid and investment portion of  these development agreements has 
been the European Development Fund(EDF).130 EU cooperation goes 
beyond the aforementioned agreements, with the Mediterranean 
Economic Development Area (MEDA), the South Africa agreement, 
and a number of  the EU's international commitments including the 
Doha development round of  World Trade Organisation(WTO) 
negotiations, the Millennium Development Goals with the United 
Nations(UN) among other multilateral processes aimed at less developed 
countries.131  
 The European Union's uniqueness as a supranational actor has already 
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been mentioned, so it is no surprise then that development aid is a 
shared competency between community (EU) and Member States. On 
the European level, the Directorate-General for Development is in 
charge of  aid policy, while on the national level this responsibility is 
variously held by either a ministry of  development cooperation, or a 
section within the ministry of  foreign affairs.132 Having development 
policies for both the EU and for the Member States presents a great 
challenge of  coordination. The EU Commission has attempted to 
alleviate this problem through the signing of  the European Consensus 
on Development133, signed by the Commission, the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Member States in 2005.134 
This is the first time that common principles of  development policy have 
been established between the EU and its members.135 The issue of  
fragmentation of  EU development policy points to one of  the reasons 
why Africa is important for European foreign relations – that it 
represents a sphere of  influence where the EU aspires to put its desired 
policy coherence into practice.136 
 In the theoretical section of  this thesis (Chapter 2), the notion of  the 
European Union as a normative power was introduced. Indeed, ethical 
and moral concerns are often said to be important elements of  the 
European Union's global outlook.137 Hyde-Price argues that the 
European self-perception as a ‘force for good’ in the world, is a 
'discursive instrument' that provides ideological and political legitimacy 
for EU foreign relations.138 It is certainly true that like other hegemonic 
powers in history, the EU attempts to export its model of  economic and 
political integration as one for the world's regions to aspire to. This is 
evidenced through the heavy emphasis on regionalism in EU foreign 
relations. The emphasis on 'normative power' at least where development 
policy is concerned, can find its roots in the Maastricht Treaty which 
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formed the EU. As explored above, the EEC had only really put an 
emphasis on economic relationships with the ACP. Within the Maastricht 
Treaty, otherwise known as the Union Treaty, the EU commits itself  to 
explicitly promote principles of  democracy, rule of  law, and human 
rights.139 It is important to consider the critical aspect of  the EU's 
exportation of  ethical and moral (or normative) ideas, as universally 
applicable. On this vein, Taylor suggests that the EU takes the European 
experience, and extrapolates it universally.140 This is also reflective of  the 
universalist beliefs of  European culture, as well as the Eurocentric 
diffusionism and developmentalism discussed at the beginning of  this 
chapter. The application of  ideas developed in a European context, has 
quite problematically caused development-related problems when it 
comes to the adoption of  neoliberal economic policies, or the 
inapplicability of  European perspectives on good governance. 
 
 The EU's political and economic development model forms the basis of  
what they export to developing countries, based on “economic 
liberalisation and the rules of  the free market, democratic norms and 
practices, and human rights protection.”141 While human rights 
protection forms an important conditionality within European 
international discourse, the issues of  neoliberal economic liberalisation 
and democratic good governance form core economic and political 
elements of  EU development policy. The issue of  poverty eradication, 
the stated goal of  EU development policy since the year 2000, is also an 
important aspect of  EU policy in Africa.  
 The Maastricht Treaty also states that 'the promotion and gradual 
integration of  developing countries into the world economy' as an aim 
of  the EU.142 This is consistent with the trade emphasis of  the Lomé 
Conventions as well as the Cotonou Agreement. From certain 
perspectives this goal may also be consistent with the EU's development 
policy priority of  poverty eradication, though this point is controversial. 
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Since the adoption of  the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, 
poverty eradication has become a priority, though it is highly doubtful 
that by pursuing neoliberal, free-trade policies within the framework of  
the WTO, that this goal can be realised. Indeed, is is argued by certain 
commentators that neoliberal economic thinking and the goal of  poverty 
eradication are completely incompatible, and indeed, contradictory. As 
Hurt asserts: “the methods outlined for achieving this objective are 
actually likely to hinder rather than assist in meeting these targets.”143  
 The arguable inability for neoliberal economic policies to work for the 
poor is not the only (economic) inconsistency when it comes to EU 
development policy. It is also argued that the EU's image as a partner of  
developing countries is damaged, given the heavy subsidisation it gives its 
agricultural producers through the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP).144 Indeed, as the EU's development policy relies increasingly on 
normative arguments, its vulnerability to accusations of  hypocrisy are 
increased. In other words, as long as the EU argues to be pursuing 
development goals that are 'good for all', once self-interested aspects of  
the EU's development-related policies can be identified, the EU's 
legitimacy as a development partner may be cast into doubt.145 
 The European Union pursues an explicit policy of  linking its 
development policies with those of  international financial institutions 
(IFIs) including the World Bank(WB), and International Monetary 
Fund(IMF). “The European Union, for its part, designs its objectives 
and principles of  development policy closely in line with international 
agreements.”146 This is also true of  EU adherence to World Trade 
Organisation rules within its most recent agreement with the ACP 
countries, Cotonou. The preferential trade basis of  the Lomé 
Conventions was abandoned in favour of  free-trade, compatible with 
WTO rules. It is argued, however, that this represents a “coercive policy 
direction” because in applying WTO rules “they are portrayed as fixed 
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and immutable and not the political construct which they really are.”147 
Essentially this represents a system of  discursive and political legitimacy 
on the international level (or regime of  truth), where development 
policies are simply justified by their association with mainstream 
development institutions such as the IFIs, as opposed to having a real 
dialogue as to the negative implications of  neoliberal economic policies, 
in this instance. Hurt argues that EU neoliberal economic policies in 
development have more to do with the self-interest of  European 
political elites and “the outward oriented fraction of  the capitalist class” 
than they do with development policies focussed on achieving legitimate 
economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.148 
 
 The European Union's attachment of  political conditionalities, most 
prominently including good governance initiatives, is thus in keeping 
with its role as a 'normative' political actor. The idea of  good governance 
can also be seen as important in EU external relations as it also relates to 
the kinds of  economic and political conditionalities (acquis communautaires) 
required for new members to join the Union. Though good governance 
itself  has not always been central to EEC/EU development policy, it has 
now gained a central role in the legitimacy of  development aid. This is 
evidenced by a statement by the EU Director-General for Development: 
“Good governance is key to development. Without the rule of  law, 
security or sound public finances aid will never succeed in giving people 
a long-term future.”149 This kind of  rhetoric is characteristic not only of  
EU development policy, but also of  the broader international consensus 
on development policy as espoused in the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of  the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). 
 Good governance represents a core political norm exported by the EU, 
as it promotes the development of  political and institutional capacity to 
facilitate neoliberal economic policies, the rule of  law, the protection of  
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human rights and democratic norms and practices.150 In the European 
Consensus on Development, it is emphasised that 'sustainable 
development includes good governance, human rights, and political, 
economic, social and environmental aspects'.151 The EU's emphasis on 
good governance is highlighted with its overwhelming support for the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)152 as 'good 
governance' is conceptualised within this initiative as “a prerequisite for 
Africa's renewal.”153 
 Taylor criticises NEPAD in that the emphasis on good governance 
reflects “the dominance of  technocratic neoliberal thinking'” as well as 
“a refusal to acknowledge that European policies have not worked in 
Africa to promote development.”154 NEPAD represents an organisation 
that has adopted orthodox notions of  good governance and democracy, 
with these “Western-derived ingredients for development” being 
unproblematically adopted.155 The success of  such an endeavour, is 
however, thrown into question when considering the fact that those who 
crafted NEPAD are many of  Africa's 'Big Men' involved in 'neo-
patrimonialism', which itself  forms part of  a functioning system of  
governance in many sub-Saharan African countries.156 This ultimately 
leads to two issues with the EU's good governance efforts in Africa: the 
extent to which these policies actually reflect reality, and also the extent 
to which good governance is simply a means to legitimising development 
assistance. Taylor makes astute observations as to the application of  EU 
good governance policies in sub-Saharan Africa:  
Because the EU’s own conception of  ‘good governance’ is technocratic 
and apolitical...  the personalisation of  political power—either at the 
low or high social levels—which stakes out well defined roles within 
most African polities, is barely understood by the EU’s own officers, 
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even in the field.157 
To the second point, highly politicised initiatives such as NEPAD and 
the Cotonou Agreement are loaded with political, democracy-affirming 
language, arguably for the purpose of  legitimacy in the developing 
'partners', and for 'domestic consumption' in the European Union.158 
Thus, regardless of  the actual effectiveness of  good governance 
initiatives, the use of  good governance still has a purpose within the 
political discourse.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter has placed the European Union's development policy 
within the broader framework of  the hegemonic development discourse, 
with policy imperatives including neoliberalism and good governance 
within the frame of  the nation-state. The EU's emphasis on normative 
power and on the spread norms related to liberal democracy and 
capitalism situate it within the universalist tendencies of  European 
culture. That is to say that the EU seeks to propagate European norms 
and values through its development policy, often without regard for the 
applicability of  those norms elsewhere.  
 With an emphasis on 'modern' ideas developed from the Renaissance, 
through the Enlightenment and resulting in the emergence of  individual 
rights and equality during the French Revolution, European culture 
contains the self-perception of  being at the height of  development. This 
informs perspectives such as Eurocentric developmentalism and 
diffusionism, supposing that while Europe is modern and dynamic, other 
parts of  the world are traditional and static, and in need of  European 
cultural norms to advance. This thinking informs modernisation and 
ultimately forms a part of  hegemonic development discourse, and 
therefore the European approach to development. The dissemination of  
neoliberalism and good governance presently represent the most 
predominant ideas on development conceived in the West, to be adopted 
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by the world as a whole.  
 The EU, initially as the EEC, has a long history of  development relations 
with sub-Saharan Africa dating back to 1963 and with the ACP countries 
more significantly, dating back to 1975 and the Lomé Conventions. 
While this relationship initially focussed on preferential trade, the EU 
demonstrated its partiality to global hegemonic institutions in pushing 
for free trade agreements when the Cotonou Agreement was signed in 
2000. This is in keeping with the largely economic focus of  the EU's 
development relations with sub-Saharan Africa, and also with the 
preeminence of  neoliberal priorities in its development policy. While 
Cotonou also saw the formal introduction of  political conditionalities 
into the EU-ACP agreement, the emphasis on good governance 
demonstrates a heavy focus on the political facilitation of  neoliberal 
market reforms above all other political priorities, including human 
rights.  
 The focus of  EU development policy in sub-Saharan Africa on 
technocratic projects such as good governance political reform, along 
with neoliberal economic reform, are a reflection of  the internal 
priorities of  the EU itself. The imposition of  these ideas on countries of  
sub-Saharan Africa  represents the imbalance of  power between the two 
regions; it is indeed a form of  soft imperialism. 
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Chapter Four: Chinese Political Culture 
 and the PRC in Africa 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In order to understand China as an historical and contemporary political 
actor in Africa, context is required. Thus, this chapter will first discuss 
Chinese political culture and its impacts on foreign policy, decision-
making and outlook before outlining China as a developmental actor in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In the social constructivist spirit that ideas give 
meaning to interests, and ultimately form important socio-political 
structures, culture here gives us this vital context. As discussed in the 
theoretical section (Chapter 2), specifying Chinese culture and its impacts 
on foreign and development policies will help to overcome Eurocentric 
assumptions that would otherwise skew the analysis.  
 China differs from the hegemonic development actors in that it is not a 
liberal democracy. The differences, however, run deeper. It is a 
hierarchical society with strong interpersonal norms, governing social 
relations. Social order is viewed as sacred, and the highest attainable goal 
is 'harmony' in the social world. Other important priorities of  Chinese 
culture include balance in the universe, and mutually acceptable 
agreements (which helps to maintain social equilibrium). These goals can 
all be achieved through the application of  pragmatism. The above goals 
have a high level of  impact on Chinese foreign policy. With the 
diminishment of  ideology, and the increase of  pragmatism, this has 
represented a return to more traditional cultural norms in Chinese 
governance and policy formation.  
 The goals of  global peace and harmony, the maintenance of  diversity 
and balance in the international system all find a place in China's foreign 
policy globally, and its development policy in Africa. The colonial pain 
of  China's own past has informed its position and desire as an anti-
hegemonic actor in the developing world. Indeed, China's policies of  
non-interference and mutual respect form part of  a Third Worldist 
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developmental ideology. 
 The first involvement of  the People's Republic of  China in Sub-Saharan 
Africa was driven by the spread of  Maoist communism, as well as Third 
World solidarity, especially with colonial independence movements. 
While the first quarter-century of  Chinese involvement in Africa was 
defined by ideology, the second saw a shift towards pragmatism in 
China's foreign and development policies. An important aspect of  
Chinese foreign policy is also the aim for China to return to its self-
perceived rightful status as a benevolent great power. African nations 
have been of  strategic importance towards the PRC gaining a more 
central role in the global system, helping the PRC to enter the United 
Nations in 1971, and offering support in light of  international 
condemnation of  the Tienanmen Square incident of  1989. The latter 
sparked a resumption in relations that would gradually increase in 
economic importance. Africa remains important in China's goal to: 
“promote the establishment of  a new just and rational international 
political and economic order.”159 It is within this broader international 
context that China's approach to development assistance evades Western 
paradigms.  Ultimately, it will be shown that China's investment and 
financial policies are influenced much by a state-business (or state 
capitalistic) approach to aid, and an approach that heightens the 
importance of  bilateral relations and local ownership for recipient 
countries. The absence of  political conditionalities is only the beginning 
of  differences between Chinese aid and traditional aid. 
 
4.2 Chinese Political Culture 
 This section will outline particularities in Chinese culture that explain 
integral aspects of  domestic politics, which are the basis of  the 
construction of  its development policy. This relies upon Lancaster's 
assertion that development policy is created on the basis of  domestic 
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politics.160 The focus on culture is also important as it “shapes a nation's 
behaviours and its development pattern.”161 This is also in keeping with 
the constructivist assertion that ideas form the basis of  political 
structures.  
 The soft use of  power approach introduced in the theoretical chapter is 
reflective of  a more Chinese approach to foreign policy. While a 
rationalised, strategic use of  soft power is conceptualised from a 
European perspective, strong and resurgent Chinese cultural norms 
which dictate the soft use of  power form the context within which 
China's foreign and development policies are constructed. Thus it is 
important to explore certain facets of  Chinese culture that have such an 
impact. This section will discuss the importance of  Confucianism in 
modern China as it has reemerged after the political culture moved away 
from communist ideology more towards pragmatism, based on 
traditional Chinese conceptions of  order, hierarchy and relationships, all 
of  which affect the construction of  interests. Intertwined with this is a 
history of  confrontation with Western colonialism, both discursively and 
physically, which underlies China's reemergence as a global power, and its 
combination of  resilience and adaptation towards hegemonic Western 
ideas.  
 Li Mingjiang  emphasises several keys to understanding soft power in the 
context of  China, including how China's foreign policy and strategy are 
shaped by: “Chinese cultural traditions, political values, and domestic and 
international imperatives...”162 The intertwined aspect of  culture and 
foreign policy, along with an understanding of  important aspects of  
Chinese political history are essential factors in understanding China as a 
global actor.  Indeed, with China's ascent as a global power, an attempt 
to maintain influence and to avoid the: “traditional power politics of  
hostile balancing or war” requires: “prudent use of  power in deeds and 
words.”163 While this is of  great strategic importance, it also fits with the 
Chinese cultural worldview where balance and harmony within society 
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and between nations is essential. 
 Chinese culture should be understood in terms of  its durability, having 
survived challenges by Western colonial powers, and later from within, 
when Mao Tse Tsung attempted to purge traditional values with the 
Cultural Revolution.164 Coupled with the end of  the communist planned 
economy, and the opening of  the market by Deng Xiaoping, was the 
reemergence of  Confucian thinking in mainstream Chinese politics. 
Deng's revision of  the goal of  China to realise 'socialism with Chinese 
characteristics' entailed a new respect for Chinese culture. Indeed, this 
also demonstrated the durability of  Chinese culture as it had: “cracked 
the universalistic claims of  scientific Marxism.”165 This is also an 
indication of  the problems that the application of  universalist ideas can 
have in specific cultural contexts.  
 The internal political orientation of  China has changed much since 1949, 
initially emphasising communist ideology under Mao, Deng would shift 
focus to pragmatism, which itself  relates to traditional Chinese norms 
that affect decision-making. The contestation that occurred during the 
shift between Maoism (ideology) and Dengism (pragmatism) 
demonstrates that: “Chinese politics are not about left vs. right, but 
about conflicts in institutional hierarchy.”166 This is an important point, 
especially with pragmatism now defining Chinese governance and 
foreign policy. The Chinese attempt to move beyond ideology in 
international relations relates directly to the domestic political trajectory. 
The move from ideology towards pragmatism is also more reflective of  
Chinese cultural values in governance. Pragmatism and lack of  ideology 
provides for “reasoned policy evaluation” and “liberation from heavy 
handed doctrine” and more towards “clear-headed reasoning.”167  
Chinese pragmatism benefits from cultural predispositions that make 
behaviour guided by the logic of  existing circumstances totally 
acceptable, and allow for unsentimental abandonment of  past 
commitments and outdated rational notions. The culture fuels pragmatic 
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motives by emphasising here and now.168 
The routine announcement and acceptance of  'reforms' and 
adjustments' “may seem to the non-Chinese mind to be substantial 
changes.”169 In reality, the Chinese political culture is very different, both 
for cultural reasons, and also for structural reasons. As far as the latter is 
concerned, the centralised control of  the Communist Party gives the 
ability for flexible policy, while the social hierarchy tends more towards 
acceptance of  changes in government policy towards sustaining the goals 
of  the society as a whole. This is one aspect demonstrating how: 
“China's traditions offer little support for democracy.”170 This is difficult 
from a Western perspective where the legitimacy of  democracy is total, 
much as the  absence of  ideology in the political system would be almost 
unthinkable from a Western perspective. 
 The collectivist nature of  Chinese society, inclusive of  mutual 
responsibility, can be seen in the concept of  'face', or the maintenance of  
one's personal honour, determined vis-à-vis one's comportment to the 
other. Indeed, the other defines the self  more in Chinese culture than, 
for instance, in Western culture.171 Part of  the importance of  the other is 
the importance that Confucius put on paired relationships, stating that 
they “provide the dimensions of  the most important realities in human 
affairs.”172 The importance of  maintaining these social relations cannot 
be understated. In Chinese tradition the social world is the most essential 
element of  existence, and within that world the pursuit of  order and 
harmony is: “the highest ideal that can be hoped for and the most sacred 
quest that human beings can conduct.”173 Harmony is supported by the 
concept of  the Golden Mean, which stresses balance, respect for 
difference and achieving mutually acceptable agreements as important in 
achieving harmony.174 An essential part of  Chinese philosophical 
tradition and statecraft, the Golden Mean highlights the importance of  
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balanced relationships in the universe.175 Included in this equation is the 
Yin (feminine or negative principle) and Yang (masculine or positive 
principle) emphasising the realities that must be balanced: “black and 
white, right and left, good and bad, them and us.”176 Thus the universal 
qualities of  Confucian thought are demonstrated, though this represents 
more of  a: “soft (aesthetic) universalism in contrast to a hard (rational) 
universalism in the West.”177 This kind of  universalism stresses the 
importance of  relationships, harmony, and balance as the highest goal in 
any social situation.  
 Guanxi, meaning 'relationship', is a key aspect to the Confucian 
conception on social order. The fundamental element of  guanxi is 
ascribed relationships which one has an obligation to honour. These are 
comprised in Confucius' 'five orders': emperors and ministers; father and 
son; husband and wife; one brother and another; and among kin and 
friends.178 These strict societal requirements: “help ensure that one's 
family and the country's leaders will command supreme loyalty”179 
Another element of  guanxi which is essential to understanding Chinese 
society, are achieved relationships. These have to do with strategic 
interest, though it must be stressed that this interest is by no means 
short-term. These relationships are long-term, involving confidence-
building as mutual trust is at their foundation.  
 With increasing business opportunities of  more open capitalist society, 
the combination of  the Confucian ethic of  achieved guanxi is 
demonstrative of  the strength, and indeed reemergence, of  traditional 
norms in contemporary Chinese society. 
Today, as China strengthens its ties with international capitalism and 
capitalist nations, weakens its actual and ideological ties to 
international communism, and experiences rapid social change, 
traditions of  both Confucianism and popular culture help fill its 
spiritual void.180  
This is an interesting process, and must be viewed with respect to 
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context, as the European experience of  the concomitant growth of  
capitalism and secularism is not entirely applicable, due to the continued 
strength of  traditional ideas and social relations in China. Indeed, even 
within ascribed relationships “sharing capital, labour markets and special 
connexions” demonstrates the durability and compatibility of  Chinese 
social structures in gaining from capitalist market opportunities.181 This 
leads to the crucial point concerning Chinese culture and the growing 
capitalist market: “China can contribute to global capitalism without 
being absorbed by it.”182 It would be a mistake to say that Chinese society 
has not been weakened by the “assaults of  modern culture” but China's 
“disciplined social core” remains strong despite the challenges posed my 
modernisation and the capitalist economy.183 
 Guanxi is an important concept for several reasons. It demonstrates the 
strength of  mutual accountability in Chinese society as well as the 
adaptability of  the social system to capitalist structures184. It is also 
important because it demonstrates that the Chinese conception of  
interest is not constrained to short-term, self-interest based mostly on 
profit maximisation (as a Western, rational choice approach would 
assume). Guanxi emphasises the interpersonal relationship on a human 
level, seeking long-term and trust-based relationships as opposed to 
simply seeking out the highest possible profit. This approach gives 
insights into the importance of  confidence-building as well as the long-
term outlook of  Chinese development and foreign policy ventures.  
 The reemergence of  China as a global power comes after the end of  a 
long period of  self-perceived inferiority in Chinese history. The period 
between the First Opium War (ending in 1842) and the end of  World 
War Two is termed as China's 'century of  humiliation.'185 Political 
incursion, economic exploitation and military aggression humiliated the 
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Chinese nation, creating a popular mentality of  victimisation.186 This is a 
strong reason for China's policy of  anti-hegemony, as the negative 
experience with European colonial powers further delegitimises 
encroachment on the sovereignty of  other nations.  
 While the period of  China's colonisation ended with the repatriation of  
Hong Kong and Macau in the late 1990s, the feeling of  historical 
humiliation still shapes Chinese security and identity.187 Since the 
founding of  the People's Republic, Chinese communist leaders “were 
still overburdened by history which placed so many chips on their 
shoulders regarding relations with the region and with the world, 
especially the West” in which “ the psychological complexities stemming 
from this historical burden have made the Chinese very defensive and 
reactive to even the smallest thing that impact their national interest.”188 
Added to this historical burden are present issues of  the US-supported 
Republic of  China (Taiwan), which is claimed by the PRC, and American 
involvement in the East Asian region more generally, making historical 
anxieties regarding hegemony more present.189  
 An outcome of  China's history of  colonial invasion, by European 
powers and later by Japan, anti-foreignism has long been present in 
Chinese society.190 This is evident not only the idea of  physical 
domination by Western realpolitik, but also in Chinese resistance to 
concepts relating to progress and human freedom, developed in the West 
and introduced to China as early as the 18th Century.191 Indeed, Deng was 
faced with the dilemma of  the reemergence of  Chinese culture and also 
the institution of  modernisation, largely influenced by conceptions of  
the economy that were developed in the West. This leads to the “serious 
contradiction which China faces... while it is opening itself  to the outside 
world, it is also trying to resist and eliminate Western ideas.”192 Deng 
warned against 'spiritual pollution' which included: humanism and the 
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theory of  human nature; bourgeois liberal ideas of  humanity and love; a 
negation of  class differences; a propagation of  religious beliefs; and 
advocation of  bourgeois ideas of  liberty, democracy and individualism.193 
Many of  these ideas are central to the hegemonic world order, as 
discussed above. Demonstrating the conflict between modernisation and 
opposition of  Western ideas, the advocacy against 'spiritual pollution' 
was restrained due to a fear that this kind of  rhetoric might oppose 
modernisation.194 
 
4.3 Cultural Approaches to Foreign Policy  
 Chinese approaches to foreign policy are both informed by the Chinese 
historical experience, as well as cultural norms which inform Chinese 
social structures and processes of  decision-making. Part of  China's 
overall foreign policy aim is to gain a position of  relative equality with 
the world's major powers, overcoming historical humiliation.195 Along 
with this historical element, the cultural aspect of  China's approach to 
foreign policy includes an emphasis on harmony and moving beyond 
ideology in international relations, based on Chinese pragmatism. 
 The emphasis on strong relationships, maintained by honour, and 
promoting harmony detailed above as parts of  Chinese culture, also 
form important parts of  Chinese foreign policy. Within Confucianism, 
for instance, there is the insistence: “on treating other nations with 
kindness and morality and believe that tenderness is the antidote to 
roughness”196 Similarly, from a Chinese perspective within the historical 
Sinocentric international order197, big states were meant to build trust 
with small states by “taking less and giving more.”198 This was a way of  
reinforcing stability in the order. The revival of  this kind of  thinking is 
evident in Deng's statement: “Do not try to gain benefit for one party 
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only. It should be mutual to both nations and their peoples.”199 Indeed, 
since the Chinese leadership's reconciliation with Chinese culture under 
Deng Xiaoping, the Golden Mean has seen a resurgence in China's 
foreign policy, providing a framework for moving beyond the military 
and ideological confrontation that sometimes characterises the 
international order.200 This kind of  flexibility in foreign policy is also 
representative of  Chinese pragmatism. An example of  this is China's 
record at the UN Security Council, where a pragmatic approach, 
especially mindful of  China's international image, guides China's voting 
behaviour.201 
It is no accident that many Chinese analysts now talk about the 
Chinese cultural emphasis on 'harmony' or 'peace' as the sources of  
China's soft power because these values essentially touch on how power 
should be used.202 
It is in this cultural context that China seeks to promote a “world of  
harmony” as key to its foreign policy. This includes respect and tolerance 
for “different ideologies and social systems”, and “consultation among 
all countries, not unilateralism driven by hegemonic ambitions.”203 The 
first basis of  this approach is strongly linked to Confucius, who stated: 
“men of  honour live in harmony with differences, men without honour 
live in conflict without differences.”204 These kind of  arguments, also 
stated by Hu Jintao: “seeking peaceful coexistence among nations and 
maintaining global diversity” are not only in keeping with Chinese 
traditions but are also attractive from postcolonialist or Third Worldist 
perspectives205This is also in keeping with the mutual respect that was, at 
the least, an ideal of  the Sinocentric world system.206 Promoting 
multilateralism can also be seen as a means for confidence-building, 
something that is compatible with the kind of  long-term trust that is 
crucial to Chinese strategic relationships (achieved guanxi). Indeed, 
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Beijing is attempting to push for a new international environment, 
especially in East Asia, through: “confidence-building measures, settling 
border disputes, practicing relative restraint, reassuring neighbours of  
benign [intentions] and actively participating in regional economic, 
political and security dialogues and institutions.”207 
 China's emphasis on a peaceful rise and global harmony are not only 
functions of  their political culture, they are also reflective of  China's 
perception of  global politics, and the mistakes made by presently 
hegemonic powers. As stated by a contemporary Chinese General: 
“China will not go down the old road of  some major Western countries, 
which embarked on an expansionist path after their rise to power”208 
This recognition of  the mistakes of  former major powers explains 
China's willingness to move beyond military and ideological 
confrontation, using pragmatic approaches to achieve Chinese 
development within the context of  a harmonious, stable globe.209 This is 
the ideal; whether it is achievable is another question entirely.  
 Governance in the Chinese context, both historical and contemporary, is 
informed by a degree of  decentralisation that allows for general 
programmes to be constructed and implemented according to regional 
requirements. “One of  the long-standing strategies of  Chinese states in 
late imperial as well as contemporary times has been to expect local 
governments to interpret general directives in ways that reflect local 
conditions.”210 This is reflective of  a distinct mode of  governance, which 
also emphasises firstly, innovation through implementation, and 
subsequently, the drafting of  universal laws and regulations.211 This is 
representative of  a cultural affinity towards pragmatism and is in stark 
contrast to European policies which usually must first adhere to laws and 
regulations prior to implementation. Such a mode of  governance adds an 
interesting perspective to China's development model, as such 
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adaptability may be of  interest to developing countries seeking for more 
innovation in development strategies.  
 This kind of  innovation, along with the kind of  pragmatism outlined 
above, as well as self-determination and social cohesion, form core 
components of  China's development model.212 China's alternative 
development paradigm has was coined by Ramo as the 'Beijing 
Consensus' which is an adaptation of  the Washington Consensus, 
discussed in a previous section on development hegemony.213 The 
'Beijing Consensus' not only emphasises China's 'no-strings attached' 
approach (or lack of  political conditionalities attached to development 
assistance), but more importantly it is based on the Chinese development 
model, where “a liberal market economy exists under an authoritarian 
political system.”214 The reformed Chinese market economy was based 
on selective application of  neoliberal model with special emphasis on 
entrepreneurship, the market,  international trade, and globalisation.215 
China's market is still heavily influenced by the state-owned sector, 
accounting for 31% of  the production of  the GDP, compared with 61% 
by the private sector.216 Despite the interest in the Chinese development 
model that will be demonstrated in the analysis: “China has intentionally 
avoided actively promoting its model.”217 This section has shown how 
China's foreign policy and governance are informed by a culture focused 
on harmony, social order and pragmatism.  
 
4.4 China in Africa  
 The People's Republic of  China emerged during the Cold War as a third 
force whose Maoist revolutionary doctrine differed from the geopolitical 
aspirations of  the preeminent communist regime, the USSR. The latter, 
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of  course was involved in the geopolitical intrigues of  the Cold War 
which saw much competition between the Soviet Union and the United 
States of  America. It is within this context that China sought to 
differentiate its position from that of  the hegemonic powers. That 
position of  third world solidarity with Africa remains, what has changed 
significantly has been the thrust of  China's foreign policy: once largely 
ideological, it is now pragmatic.  
 From a foreign policy standpoint, much of  the People's Republic of  
China's international relations are motivated by the aspiration for China 
to return to its historically self-perceived role as a benevolent (and 
responsible) great power.218 Indeed, this desire to gain a more central role 
in the global system is also argued to be part and parcel of  why Africa 
has historically been of  importance to China. It is no coincidence that 
China's increased involvement in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s  was 
linked with a desire to secure support for replacement of  the Republic 
of  China (Taiwan) in the United Nations and ergo in the UN Security 
Council. Of  course adding to this complex context was also the PRC's 
spread of  revolutionary, anti-colonial, communist ideology as a counter 
to the Soviet Union.219  
 While Chinese involvement in Africa waned during the 1980s, it was the 
Tiananmen Square incident of  1989 that pushed Africa, and indeed the 
developing world as a whole, to the forefront of  Chinese foreign policy. 
The PRC's global reputation was severely damaged as many Western 
governments heavily criticised China's human rights record. This was in 
turn perceived as a gross violation of  China's internal sovereignty, thus 
the reassertion of  two important policies that continue to be central to 
Chinese foreign policy: “non-interference in state sovereignty and 
freedom from 'hegemony'... ”220 China's reemergence with what Taylor 
terms as Africa's 'all-weather friends' was part of  an effort by the PRC to 
gain allies in the developing world, and thus in the United Nations as 
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well. It is in this context that China gained much support in challenging a 
global regime that largely favours democracy and human rights. Perhaps 
viewing itself  as an emerging leader of  the developing world, Chinese 
foreign policy has sought officially to establish non-interference and 
mutual respect for the affairs of  each sovereign nation as a fundamental 
basis for a new international order.221 These are important points in 
Chinese foreign policy   where Chinese political perspectives counter the 
Western perspectives that inform what is termed here as the 'hegemonic' 
development discourse. 
 
 Chinese involvement in Africa began in earnest in the 1956, following 
the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, with an 
emphasis on Third World solidarity, and on spreading the revolutionary 
values of  communism from a Chinese perspective.222 While the major 
communist power at the time, the Soviet Union (USSR), was also heavily 
involved in Africa during the Cold War, China sought to promote its 
own Maoist political ideals. As the Sino-Soviet split became a more open 
reality, and especially as China's cultural revolution began, the People's 
Republic of  China (PRC) became a competitor with the USSR in 
promoting what it viewed as a truer version of  communism on the 
African continent. China's development assistance thus represented as 
much of  a challenge to the West as it did to the Soviet Union.223 
 The PRC's political revolutionary focus on anti-imperialism and anti-
colonialism fuelled its support of  African liberation struggles beginning 
in the 1960s.224 This would help to cement China's status as an anti-
hegemonic force in the developing world. Along with the ideological 
component of  Chinese involvement, was a more pragmatic approach 
involving financial aid and technological assistance needed for 
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modernisation in many newly independent African nations.225 This was 
especially strong during the PRC's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), and 
was focussed on the provision of  agricultural assistance, though there 
were also emphases on health and education.226 With this early Chinese 
development assistance, they sought to export methods that were 
integral in to their own national development experience, which was very 
much underway at that time.227 Even within this more pragmatic aspect 
of  China's early involvement in Africa, both Chinese cultural and 
political  ideas were transposed into the African context.  
 Bräutigam identifies two kinds of  ideas that the Chinese brought with 
their (largely agricultural) development assistance in the 60s and 70s. 
Firstly, 'communist culture' was shared, focussing on “symbols and 
values of  self-reliance and struggle” as well as sharing the 'thoughts of  
Mao' and certain beliefs about lifestyle and equity characteristic not only 
of  communism, but also of  the Chinese interpretation thereof.228 
Secondly, the certain aspects of  traditional Chinese culture were shared 
including work ethic, a leadership model based on awe and respect, and 
“values of  authority, hierarchy, and Confucian paternalism.”229 While 
China's more recent drive for financial and technical assistance in Africa 
is less infused with the former, communist ideology, the latter traditional 
Chinese ideas are important, and even resurgent, as seen in the section 
above on Chinese culture.  
 
 Through China's development projects there were also other ideological 
components, especially derived from China's own development 
experience. While not always replicated, they did still have influence. 
These included a focus on 'serving the people'; preserving the dignity of  
labour and organising production on a group basis.230 Chinese 
development projects also sought to reaffirm the supremacy of  the state, 
something crucial to their domestic and international objectives at 
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assuring that state sovereignty is supreme, both in national and global 
contexts.231 
 China's own national experience in development includes a political 
culture with a different perspective on governance and the rule of  law, 
where the latter is seen as malleable as well as subservient to the former. 
It has often been noted in Chinese political and economic development, 
that often certain practices have been adopted before the legal 
framework has been set into place.232 Indeed, this perspective differs 
starkly from the West, where the rule of  law is supreme, and where 
democratic, consultative governance is emphasised. This kind of  
approach might prove attractive as it is more innovative from a 
development perspective. 
 China's domestic policies changed dramatically with the beginning of  its 
socialist modernisation programme through market-oriented reforms 
introduced by Deng Xiaoping beginning in 1978. This, in turn, meant 
that Chinese aid policies themselves also become a more pragmatic 
approach, with more economic thinking coupled with the cultural 
tradition of  pragmatism, as discussed above. Throughout the 1980s 
China focussed itself  internally, seeking international financing for its 
own modernisation programme, which limited its role in Africa as 
African nations offered little opportunity of  providing foreign direct 
investment for China itself. But China would reemerge as an important 
aid contributor in 1990s, sparked by the Tiananmen square incident of  
1989. 
 Under heavy international pressure due to the crackdown on democratic 
reformists: “Chinese aid in the post-Tiananmen era increased 
dramatically as Beijing scrambled to win over allies and sympathetic 
associates.”233 This incident only caused strengthening of  China's policy 
of  non-interference in internal affairs, and would provide a continued 
emphasis on South-South solidarity against the 'hegemony' of  the West. 
The Tiananmen square incident sparked a massive increase in Chinese 
development aid to Africa, at the time promoted by political imperatives. 
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This increase in Chinese involvement in Africa can be characterised as a 
reemergence of  China on the continent, and also forms the more 
contemporary foundation for China's massive increase in state-business 
involvement in Africa from 1998 to present.234 
4.5 China and Third World Development Ideology  
 It was in the spirit of  anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism (or, anti-
hegemony) that the People's Republic of  China first became involved in 
Africa, particularly in the era of  independence in the 1960s and 1970s. 
China's shared status as a country that had a sense of  humiliation 
brought on by colonisation and exploitation, and also as a country which 
was itself  attempting to develop, helped China gain legitimacy as a Third 
World partner for many Sub-Saharan African nations.235 Indeed, China's 
relations with Africa have seen it gain the status of  a leader in the 
developing world. Part of  this is a sense of  solidarity with many Third 
World political elites against the international norm of  intervention, 
perceived as an aspect of  neocolonialism, or hegemony of  the West.236 
 China's involvement in Africa from the outset has had as much to do 
with strategies in international relations as it has with China's self-
perception, as well as its domestic political and economic efforts at 
modernisation and development. The People's Republic's strategy of  
gaining a more prominent role in global politics is a major part of  its 
foreign relations with African nations. China has sought to confirm its 
status as a “benevolent great power.”237 The country's political class  sees 
this as an historical return to the prominence of  China globally.` 
Ensuring international respect means that African votes are important at 
the UN, much as they were in approving the PRC's accession to the UN 
Security Council, replacing the Republic of  China (Taiwan), in 1971.238 
 Much of  Beijing's ideological narrative is rooted in national political 
priorities, of  which non-interference is a crucial part. Maintaining 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity are key components of  both China's 
domestic and foreign policies.239 This is another indication of  China's 
foreign policy being informed by its own domestic political issues.240 This 
follows with the assertion that development policy, as a component of  
foreign policy, is equally shaped by domestic politics.241 
 Despite China's perceived role of  leadership in the developing world, 
China's political leadership, since Deng, has emphasised maintaining a 
subtle role. This is part of  Deng's 'guiding principles of  twenty-four 
characters', which stated: “[w]atch the world with a calm mind; stand 
firmly; confidently deal with the difficulties; keep a low profile; never act 
as a leader and do things well.”242 Part of  China's reluctance to have an 
outright leadership role in the developing world is also in keeping with 
their anti-hegemonic foreign policy. Deng also emphasised the pragmatic 
aspect of  avoiding the leadership role: “Those practicing hegemony have 
a bad reputation, so acting as the head of  the Third World will also be ill-
reputed. This is not a word of  courtesy, rather, a realistic political 
consideration.”243 Indeed, Chinese foreign policy has much to do with 
pragmatism and the ability to make decisions without obstacles such as 
ideology, and in this case, it could be argued that a more prominent 
developing world leadership role could also potentially constrain China's 
room for pragmatic decision-making.   
 
 
 The growing influence of  China in Africa represents much more than an 
increase in potential geo-political competition between East and West, 
though this is indeed an important aspect.244 Especially through the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC),245 China has stated its 
aim at creating a new order globally, especially among developing 
nations. With an emphasis on peace and harmony, prosperity and 
development, a major component of  China's political discourse in Africa 
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focuses on: “the emergence of  a just and equitable new political and 
economic order by fostering unity among developing countries.”246 This 
points to a need for the developing world to re-imagine a world where 
the West's hegemony is no longer ultimate, and perhaps, where liberal 
democracy is no longer the only form of  legitimate governance. 
 The PRC directly addresses its strong opposition to key aspects of  the 
present hegemonic  global order within FOCAC's Beijing Declaration.247 
They push for the right of  countries to adopt their own political models, 
human rights included:  
countries, that vary from one another in social system, stages of  
development, historical and cultural background and values, have the 
right to choose their own approaches and models in promoting and 
protecting human rights in their own countries.248  
In the same declaration, political conditionalities based on human rights 
themselves “constitute a violation of  human rights” and human rights 
and good governance-based conditionalities should “themselves be 
vigorously opposed.”249 These are direct challenges to the hegemonic 
order in development and they have proven popular with much of  the 
African political leadership. China's policy of  characterising the world as 
multi-polar, in which China is a benevolent power, is becoming a truism 
in Africa where its push for a new kind of  global order is gaining 
traction.250 Also notable is the linkage between this perspective and the 
Confucian principle regarding maintaining diversity.  
 The attempt at forging a new global order does not only cover the 
political dimension. The Chinese economic option in Africa may very 
well mean an opportunity for African nations to escape the grips of  
neocolonialism in the form of  economic dependency on the West. China 
may represent an opportunity for reworking the colonial trade structure 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.251 It is also interesting to note that favoured 
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market access for the Chinese is justified on the basis of  South-South 
solidarity, and counter-hegemony.252 China's emphasis on each nation's 
right to choose its own approaches and models does not only apply to 
the political realm; it also applies to the ways in which they do business, 
the way the economy is structured, and ultimately how they develop 
economically.253 On the economic level, this can be seen as a challenge to 
the neoliberal economic reforms and conditionalities imposed upon 
African countries over the last quarter century, as discussed in the EU 
and development hegemony chapter. 
 China's prominent influence in Africa today, with preferred market 
access for resources as well as for Chinese corporations still has much to 
do with the foundation of  political legitimacy that China established on 
the continent during the 1960s and 1970s. China's “historical ties with 
many of  the African liberation movements and political elite” represents 
a political factor that underlies the PRC's ability to create such strong 
economic relations with African bilateral partners. China is not only 
considered a rival option (as opposed to 'traditional donors' largely of  
the West) for creating economic development, it is also considered to be 
a country which has proven its anti-hegemonic credentials and thus can 
be engaged on the basis of  South-South solidarity as well.254  
 
4.6 Present Era of  Chinese Investment and Development 
Assistance 
 The present era of  Chinese investment in Africa has its foundation in 
China's revolutionary political ties established in the 1960s and 1970s, as 
well as the reemergence of  relations after the Tiananmen square incident 
of  1989. On the political level, Chinese engagement continues to 
emphasise the importance of  South-South relations, and the 
strengthening of  the principles of  non-interference and mutual respect. 
These ideas now find themselves with new meaning, as they are now 
being applied to bilateral economic partnerships between the PRC and 
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especially resource-rich African countries as China attempts to secure 
resource and energy security, as well as developing future markets for 
export.255  Underdeveloped countries are also included in China's Africa 
strategy, especially as China seeks to ensure that Taiwan not have 
diplomatic relations, supported by development assistance.  
 China's involvement in Africa is controversial, not only for its political 
implications but also due to the threat of  uneven economic relationships 
equating some kind of  new economic colonialism.256 China's anti-
hegemonic political rhetoric attempts to counter these sentiments, in 
combination with the relative empowerment of  African bilateral partners 
in commissioning most projects financed by the Chinese. What is 
certainly true is that Chinese development assistance and its approach is 
fundamentally different, which will now be discussed.  
 
 Chinese development assistance has come under much fire in the West 
for the absence of  political conditionalities, as well as the support of  
African countries regardless of  the legitimacy of  their regime by Western 
political standards. There is a fear that without conditionalities, efforts by 
Western governments and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
to improve governance, transparency and human rights, will be eroded.257 
As discussed in the EU and development hegemony chapter (Chapter 3), 
the ability of  such reforms to have results in the first place, can be 
questioned. Another issue arises when it comes to the Chinese 
development policy process, which itself  lacks transparency. The 
structure of  Chinese development assistance draws criticism because it 
evades agreed-upon international (read Western-developed) standards, 
and because it is little understood. 
 Part of  the difficulty in the discourse about Chinese aid, is due to 
ambiguity on the Chinese side as to what actually constitutes aid in the 
first place. As Alden and Alves point out, Beijing has a broad definition 
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as to what aid actually is.258 “The current inconsistencies in China's 
definition of  aid give rise to the lack of  clarity on its framework and 
policy making process.”259 One of  the ways in which China broadens the 
definition of  aid is that many of  its development projects are done 
through state-business partnerships, so-called 'coalition engagements'.260 
This direct state-business approach to foreign policy is certainly 
something new in international relations which gives a whole new 
meaning to the idea of  'state capitalism'.261 The favoured market access 
for Chinese corporations that comes with this approach certainly raises 
alarm bells in the West, as their traditionally dominant business interests 
are quickly facing uneven competition in many resource-rich African 
countries. Traditional Western business hegemony is being challenged in 
Africa, in major part because of  China's 'coalition engagements'.262 
Again, this overt, and relatively unique approach demonstrates 
“iconoclastic willingness to change old patterns”, whether it be 
domestically, or internationally.263 This is another impact of  pragmatism 
on Chinese foreign and development policies. 
 There are several aspects of  China's approach that differ from traditional 
aid practice. One of  these aspects has much to do with national 
ownership and mutual respect: the initial step to aid projects involving 
Chinese financing (grants, interest-free or concessional loans) is the 
submission of  a proposed project by the prospective recipient 
government. This assures that the project fits with the developmental 
goals of  the African government in question, and is also symbolically 
important in that it reaffirms their national sovereignty, as well as the 
spirit of  South-South cooperation. “This is viewed in Chinese policy 
making circles as preferable, given the continent's history with cash 
disbursements by traditional donors.”264 Usually concessional loans are 
provided, subsidised by the Chinese government, with the terms of  the 
loan (purpose, amount, maturity and interest rate) agreed upon through a 
                                                 
258 Davies, “How China delivers development assistance to Africa,” 1-2. 
259 Ibid., 2. 
260 Ibid., vii. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Chris Alden and Martyn Davies, “A Profile of  the Operations of  Chinese Multinationals in 
Africa,” South African Journal of  International Affairs 13, no. 1 (Summer/Autumn 2006): 83. 
263 Bräutigam, Chinese aid and African development, 28. 
264 Davies, “How China delivers development assistance to Africa,” 8. 
79 
bilateral, intergovernmental framework.265 The loans are provided by one 
of  China's policy banks: the Agricultural Development Bank of  China, 
the China Development Bank or Export-Import Bank of  China 
(EXIM).266 EXIM Bank funds most Chinese loans to African nations.  
 Chinese loans are agreed upon on a bilateral basis, but a way in which 
they also differ from traditional development aid, is that the transfer of  
money is 'virtual' rather than 'real'. Funds in reality are transfered directly 
to the contractor set to carry out the project. These contractors are 
always Chinese companies, as no less than 50% of  the project must be 
carried out by Chinese companies.267 This approach to dispersing funds 
directly to contractors, bypassing the national government, leaves very 
little chance for corruption.268  
The rationale is premised on the notion that if  an African country is 
in need of  aid, and can identify the project that it requires the aid to 
pursue – then it is simpler for the aid giver to simply deliver on the 
project rather than just transfer the funds. This prevents the possibility 
of  corruption in country eating away at the funds.269 
Not only does this pragmatic approach neutralise the potential for 
corruption on the national level, it also effectively neutralises Western 
criticism on the level of  governance, at least inasmuch as corruption is 
concerned . 
 The approach to loans explained above forms a part of  the 'Angola 
Mode', which generally refers to the exchange of  loans, generally for 
infrastructure, in return for Chinese access to energy and natural 
resources.270 This, of  course, involves no political conditionalities. More 
precisely, in return for infrastructure Chinese natural resource companies 
are given: “the right to mine natural resources through acquisition of  
equity stakes in a national oil company or through acquiring licenses for 
production.”271 The emphasis on the provision of  infrastructure is 
another indication of  China's pragmatism due to the fact that traditional 
donors have long abandoned infrastructure as part of  their development 
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strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa.272 
 
 A major issue for traditional donors is both with the different approach 
that the Chinese take to aid, void of  political conditionalities, coupled 
with a relative lack of  transparency in deals made with African 
governments, and in the aid policy-making process more generally. This 
lack of  transparency can be explained, at least in part, due to the 
plethora of  government departments and agencies involved in China's 
foreign aid process.  
 China's foreign aid process begins with allocation of  funds from the 
national budget, decided by the State Council. The Ministry of  Finance 
is then responsible for drawing up the budget for foreign aid itself. The 
Ministry of  Commerce is the lead agency in the distribution of  aid, 
through the Department of  Aid to Foreign Countries which coordinates 
foreign aid and foreign aid policy. Also involved in this process are the 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (MOFA), responsible for China's Africa 
Policy as well as Forum on Africa-China Cooperation announcements of  
aid projects, along with the Ministries of  Agriculture, Health, and 
Education who are also responsible for more specific aid projects.273  
 Added to this plethora of  stakeholders are the Chinese contracts 
carrying out many projects, as well as China's EXIM bank which 
finances most projects. It is documented that even within the Chinese 
policy-making process around aid there are major communication 
problems.274 This, combined with China's historical policy of  isolation, 
causes concerns over secrecy, with many in the West questioning China's 
motives as there is not a great deal of  information on Chinese aid policy 
available. This has led to what Taylor describes as a fallacy of  a highly 
coordinated resource diplomacy strategy, as is propagated in the Western 
media.275 In an effort to increase transparency, the Chinese government 
released a report entitled China's Foreign Aid in April, 2011.276 
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 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is itself  the 
centrepiece of  China's relationship with the continent. Established in 
2000 with its first ministerial conference, the forum has had four 
ministerial conferences since its inception. The Forum represents a place 
where Chinese and African governments announce major projects. 
There is also a major political element to these conferences such as joint 
declarations and action plans. It is through Forum declarations, such as 
the Beijing Declaration mentioned above, that the aim of  “overhauling 
the global order” is stated, and where “China's traditional hostility to 
what it sees as 'hegemony'” is advanced.277 Both Chinese Ministries of  
Foreign Affairs and Commerce participate in this forum, politically 
confirming the importance of  economics within China's Africa Policy.  
 An interesting aspect of  Chinese aid to Africa is that it almost always 
occurs on a bilateral level. This is in keeping with China's political 
perspectives on the supremacy of  nation states in international 
relations.278 Though FOCAC provides a multilateral forum for 
cooperation and dialogue; other than the China-Africa Fund for 
Development (CAFD), aid negotiations, strategies and disbursements are 
done on a bilateral level. This emphasis on bilateral relations has also to 
do with the importance of  African state control over loan concessions; 
this also provides for immediate assurance that China is delivering what 
respective governments want.279 Regionalists have been particularly 
critical of  China's bilateral approach, arguing that it ignorances 
important regional integration efforts in Africa, especially those 
promoted by NEPAD280 
 What underlies China's bilateral approach are the emphasis of  the 
supremacy of  the state, the assurance that the needs of  the African state 
in question are being addressed (in as much as they also fit with Chinese 
interests), as well as other strategic issues such as the assurance that 
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Taiwan remains unrecognised by most (and for the PRC, ideally none) of  
the global community. These tendencies are more or less evident when 
simply analysing China's foreign policy from a distance. It could also be 
argued that cultural elements are also important reasons for China's 
bilateral approach, including the emphasis on paired relations within 
Confucianism, as well as the kind of  bilateral confidence-building that is 
part of  achieved relationships (guanxi). 
 
 The extent to which political ideology is still present in Chinese aid is an 
interesting topic given China's revolutionary history in Africa in the 
1960s and 1970s. Of  course, an external emphasis on communist culture 
has been largely absent from China's political discourse for decades, 
especially since the commencement of  the 'socialist modernisation' 
project with the introduction of  market reforms under Deng Xiaoping in 
1978. The extent of  Chinese ideological involvement is perhaps limited 
to a Third World development ideology that justifies China's tacit 
legitimacy as a leader in the developing world. Despite China's reluctance 
to assume a role of  leadership, it is at least a figure of  challenge and 
change to the hegemonic development discourse, and thus to the 
hegemonic world order. China's Third World development ideology is 
linked to domestic priorities of  sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as 
well as mutual respect. The policy that any country, regardless of  
political or economic system, has the right to develop, is certainly a 
policy that gains more traction in developing countries than the political 
conditionalities of  the EU and the West more generally. It is clear that 
the emphasis on bilateralism also affects China's state-business relations 
as aid projects are almost always done on a bilateral basis, and even 
within Chinese projects the supremacy of  the nation state is 
emphasised.281 Though there are no domestic political conditionalities 
when it comes to Chinese aid, there is of  course the issue of  the 
Republic of  China (Taiwan). Affirmation of  the One China Principle 
(non-recognition of  Taiwan) represents the only clear political 
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requirement in foreign relations between African nations and China.282  
 China's push for a new order based on cultural relativism, non-
interference and mutual respect among developing nations represents a 
strong challenge to the present hegemonic development regime. With 
this in mind, there is a question as to whether China is repoliticising 
aid.283 Since the end of  the Soviet Union, development in Africa has 
largely been the concern of  liberal democratic actors, whose universalist 
ideals have sought the spread of  the free market and liberal democracy, 
through political conditionalities. Along with an emphasis on the rights 
of  each country to choose its own (politico-economic) models, China 
also places great importance on economic rights as well as rights of  
subsistence as opposed to the liberal democratic emphasis on civil and 
political rights.  
 Prior to the 1980s it was more broadly accepted that democratic 
institutions, rule of  law and human rights come at a later stage of  
development.284 This idea was turned on its head in the West, and 
therefore in the policies of  the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, then advocating that through politico-economic (good 
governance) reform initiatives must be adopted in order for developing 
nations to receive aid. However, the People's Republic, engaged in a 
development process of  its own, sticks to the former definition, where 
capacity must be built in order to provide greater assurances along the 
lines of  political and civil rights. That is to say, that economic and social 
rights, especially the right to develop economically, and thus the right to 
economically viable lives for its citizens, comes before the strengthening 
of  individual freedoms and the opening of  political discourse, among 
other things. These ideological elements demonstrate that China's 
political influence still very much runs counter to the imperatives of  the 
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West.  
 While China's involvement in Africa is causing alarm in the West, there is 
a potential on the political side for African countries to gain stronger 
footing in the global system. China's failure to participate in the 
mainstream development culture has spurred a “new wave of  Afro-
realism” where African political elites believe they can gain new 
negotiating power with the EU and United States, given the Chinese 
option.285 There is also the belief  that as African nations develop into as 
stronger economic bloc, through Chinese assistance, these nations can 
gain a greater voice globally.286 This is at least where the political 
discourse lies for China in Africa. Whether or not resource-rich African 
countries are over-exposing themselves on the economic side to Chinese 
resource exploitation is another question entirely. Another vital question 
is the real impact Chinese involvement has on the political discourse in 
Africa itself, something that will be addressed in the next chapter on the 
EU and China in Africa from African perspectives, where there is also 
the potential of  modelling African economic and political efforts after 
those of  the Chinese.  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
 This chapter started by discussing Chinese culture and its Confucian 
influences. A strong social hierarchy governed by interpersonal norms 
form the societal basis for attempting to achieve harmony, the highest 
goal in the social world. Achieving harmony, especially through the 
Golden Mean with its emphasis on balance in the universe, mutually 
acceptable agreements requires a certain degree of  pragmatism. Paired 
relationships were discussed as the most basic components of  the 
Chinese social hierarchy, where the concept of  ascribed guanxi 
emphasises the maintenance of  order, through social responsibilities that 
must be fulfilled. Achieved guanxi is also important as it demonstrates the 
long-term, trust-based nature of  strategic relationships in the Chinese 
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context. That is to say that rational choice theory does not adequately 
capture this dynamic.  
 The goals of  Chinese culture are translatable to its foreign policy, with 
the soft use of  power laid out by cultural concepts such as the Golden 
Mean and the pursuit of  harmony. The Chinese cultural worldview views 
balance and harmony as something essential between nations as well as 
within society. An emphasis on diversity, in respecting and tolerating 
different ideologies and social systems, as well as goals of  peace, 
harmony, prosperity and development, are all part of  China's vision for a 
new global order that is compatible with its culture. 
 The evolution from an ideological foreign policy in Africa from the 
1950s to 1970s, to a more pragmatic policy from the late 1970s onwards, 
was in parallel to a similar change in China itself. This highlights the 
importance of  domestic politics when looking at how external policy is 
constructed.  
 Historical context is also important in terms of  understanding China as a 
global actor, where its drive to become a benevolent global power is 
catalysed by the humiliation caused by colonialism and exploitation in 
the 19th and 20th centuries. This is also important context when viewing 
China's anti-hegemonic policies of  non-interference and mutual respect, 
which have much to do with historical and contemporary experiences 
with Western hegemony. Indeed, these policies reflect China's domestic 
strategic interests as much as they also garner support among other 
Third World nations who are also against the norm of  intervention, 
viewed as an implement of  neocolonialism.  
 After initial developmental involvement in Africa from the late 1950s to 
the early 1970s, China's development assistance stagnated until 1989. 
Then, the Tienanmen Square incident forced China, then under fire by 
the West for its human rights record, to seek allies. China would turn 
back to Africa, whose support had also assisted the PRC in gaining 
ascension to the United Nations in 1971. This resumption of  relations 
between China and Sub-Saharan Africa provides the background for the 
present involvement of  the PRC in the region.  
 China's development assistance has been criticised by the West for its 'no 
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strings attached' nature, though this approach has arguably proven 
popular with African recipients. China's approach has sought to be more 
equitable, as a means of  countering the traditional donors' relationships 
with African nations that involved dictates more than genuine dialogue. 
Chinese development policy reaffirms the supremacy of  the state 
through the bilateral negotiation of  agreements, and also in that the 
policies of  non-interference and mutual respect prevent any formal 
discussion of  national political structures in recipient countries.287 
Indeed, this policy is also connected to the emphasis on diversity and 
China's own reluctance to openly promote its own development model, 
despite increasing interest in sub-Saharan Africa to replicate that model. 
China is also perceived as a rival option and counter-balance to the West, 
offering African nations new negotiating leverage with the EU and the 
US. While the Western media often fixates itself  on the threat of  
Chinese 'economic colonisation', that would be an oversimplification of  
a relationship that is based on political and economic interdependence 
and solidarity.  
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 China’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa does not happen in a vacuum. 
This thesis has discussed the Western, and therefore European 
hegemony over development. This chapter compares, and contrasts 
important aspects that inform the development policies of  both actors 
in question, the European Union and the People’s Republic of  China. 
Ultimately, China's discourse regarding development indeed diverges 
with that of  Europe. The convergence of  both actors' development 
policies is unlikely due to sharply different domestic political contexts, 
from which development policy directly emerges. China's challenge will 
remain, though factors such as Chinese pragmatism, and EU-China 
interdependency will assure a certain level of  dialogue. 
 The first section will discuss how the priorities of  each actor are 
reflective of  particular worldviews that are creations of  culture and 
history. The social constructivist approach of  the thesis will be reviewed, 
emphasising the importance of  domestic ideas in creating development 
policy as well as international structures. Cultural outlook is important as 
the approaches of  Europe and China can be characterised as universalist 
and particularist, respectively. These fundamental differences will also be 
discussed with respect to actor-specific constructions of  interests and 
approaches to soft power. Finally, this section will examine how domestic 
politics affect development policy, including approaches to governance, 
and the reflection of  internal political changes and domestic strategic 
priorities in development policy. 
 The second section will provide an overview of  the European approach 
to development. The placement of  the European Union within the 
hegemonic global order and the hegemonic development discourse will 
be discussed. This puts the EU in the prevailing global systemic culture 
which, following Cox's definition of  hegemony, forms a regime that 
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defines legitimate domestic norms and practices.288 This includes the 
spread of  liberal democratic political norms and neoliberal economic 
norms within a context of  soft imperialism in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
respective perspectives of  Eurocentric 'developmentalism' and 
'diffusionism' underlie Europe’s cultural worldview and legitimise the 
spread of  these norms. EU-China interdependency will then be 
discussed, in the context of  civilian power, also addressing the failure to 
date of  the institutionalisation of  EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation.  
The third section is devoted to China’s development discourse. China’s 
cultural outlook and its effect on foreign policy are discussed. This 
includes the shift from communist ideology to pragmatism in domestic 
and foreign policy, within a varied context of  resistance to and 
adaptation of, Western ideas. China’s aid approach is then analysed, with 
the PRC’s explicit focus on bilateralism, supremacy of  the state, and 
advocacy for the right for nations to possess distinct political and 
economic systems. China’s alternative order will be reviewed with the 
query as to whether or not it represents a discursive shift in 
development. It will be argued that it is representative of  a competing 
systemic culture, where European cultural universalism contrasts 
significantly with Chinese cultural particularism. This trend is 
strengthened by the cultural, historical and strategic bases of  China’s 
non-interference and mutual respect approaches and other policies. It 
will be argued that China’s development approach, the Beijing Consensus 
included, does in fact stand to weaken the European Union’s soft 
imperialist position in sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, Chinese 
pragmatism, cultural ideals regarding harmony, and a willingness to be 
perceived as a benevolent great power, will constrain Western fears 
regarding the negative impacts of  Chinese involvement in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 The concluding section will outline African prospects in light of  
European and Chinese involvement in development on the continent. 
Significantly, from the perspective of  political elites, more policy space is 
created as a result of  this involvement, while there is also an opportunity 
                                                 
288 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and IR.” 
89 
to change the colonial trade structure.289 Lessened European and 
Western hegemony may however have negative consequences politically, 
as many in African civil society fear. However, from an economic 
perspective, the example China has set for pragmatic, state capitalist 
development surely will create some optimism for alternatives to 
neoliberal capitalism in the development of  African economies moving 
forward.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Approach 
 The thesis began by laying out a social constructivist approach to the 
European Union and People's Republic of  China's respective 
development discourses in sub-Saharan Africa. Establishing ideas as 
fundamental to political structures, strategy and interests provides a 
foundation for understanding the complexity and difference between 
two very distinct actors in development. A key part of  this distinction is 
culture, something very often ignored by international relations analysis. 
With the emphasis that development policy is reflective of  domestic 
political priorities, culture also has an important impact on perceptions 
and approaches of  both actors. For example, Europe's universalist 
culture tends towards the spread of  political norms while China's culture 
is more particularist and with emphasis on respect for diversity, the 
explicit spread of  Chinese political norms is low in comparison. 
 The theoretical approach proves important linkages between culture and 
development policy and demonstrates how a non-Eurocentric approach 
is essential in analysing the emergence of  non-Western actors in 
development in particular, and international relations more generally. 
That is to say that non-Western approaches need to be incorporated into 
international relations analysis, thus the incorporation of  cultural aspects 
in the analysis is an attempt to move beyond Western assumptions 
including methodological individualism and the assumption of  rational 
                                                 
289 Carlos Oya, “Greater Africa-China Economic Cooperation:Will This Widen ‘Policy Space’?,” 
Development Viewpoint 4 (2008): 1. 
90 
choice as the basis of  all decision-making.290 
 The Eurocentric bias of  international relations theory in particular, and 
of  social science more generally presents a difficulty for balanced 
analysis of, in this instance, a European and non-European actor. The 
use of  a social constructivist approach emphasising the differing makeup 
of  political actors based on interests, and the negotiation of  differing 
systemic cultures in the global order points towards moving beyond 
analysis that assumes a static system, where all states behave according to 
a uniform set of  interests. Particular concepts of  soft power applicable 
to each actor (soft imperialism, civilian power, and Normative Power 
Europe for the EU and soft use of  power for China) demonstrate the 
importance of  contextual, specific theories in explaining the approaches 
of  Western and non-Western actors. Along with an international system 
created in Europe/the West, Eurocentrism exists in social science. One 
should however be mindful of  Wallerstein's assertion that the myth of  
the “value-neutral observer” is at the core of  the strength of  
Eurocentrism, as an approach incorporating culture  challenges this.291 
 
5.3 The Role of  Interests 
 The China-in-Africa discourse is prevalent in the West, particularly in 
countries heavily linked with Africa.292 The core allegation of  this 
discourse is that in its pursuit of  fossil fuels and natural resources, China 
is in the process of  colonising Africa.293 This is a rather ironic claim, 
given Western colonial and neocolonial (domination) of  Africa – to 
understand the improbability of  this claim, the Chinese approach must 
be understood from a Chinese perspective.  
 In this context, the construction of  interests comes into play.  Do 
culturally specific notions of  interests not have any bearing on these 
judgements? As stated above, culture is not a simple material factor; it is 
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also the way people do business.294 The effect of  cultural ideas on foreign 
and development policy and interaction is important. From a European 
perspective, rational choice is assumed to be the basis of  decision-
making with emphasis towards short-term gain. China, on the other 
hand demonstrably has more long-term economic interests in Africa.295 
Chinese long-term interest also relates to the emphasis of  trust and 
maintenance of  relationships through confidence-building, along with 
mindfulness towards the maintenance of  face, balance and social order. 
 Interests are of  great importance in international relations as they give 
meaning to what motivates states as global actors. The trouble with 
interests in mainstream international relations theory is that they are 
often reduced to rational choice theory, again revealing of  Eurocentrism 
in the discipline. However, a social constructivist approach allows for 
moving beyond this basic notion supported by Eurocentric biases on 
human nature by suggesting that interests are based on contextual ideas, 
and not simple material interests.  Indeed, if  as Wendt emphasises, 
material interests are composed of  ideas in the first place, then surely the 
approach to securing those material interests can also be informed by 
diverse ideas.296 While from a cultural perspective European actors may 
behave more closely to rational choice, especially due to a cultural 
emphasis on individualism, in a Chinese context interests and decision-
making are more impacted by collectivism. The Self  is situated closer to 
the Other in Chinese culture, thus interests cannot be reduced to the 
level of  the individual.297 Thus, the context of  decision-making and 
interests is different. 
 This means that it is simplistic to assume that Chinese economic interest 
in Africa equates short-term interest due to the inter-linkage of  short-
term, rational choice theory and economics. This is important because a 
basic assumption of  the China-in-Africa discourse's theory that China is 
colonising Africa is based on the notion that China's construction of  
interests is the same as those of  former Western colonial powers. While 
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this requires further study, the contention is that complexity of  Chinese 
interests in Africa prevent China from behaving as a colonising power 
either formally or informally. That said, the risk for African states of  
economic dependency on China is a different issue. 
 Another indication as to the importance of  cultural specificity in the 
Chinese context is the notion of  citizenship, which generally has less to 
do with self-interest and more to do with membership in the nation as a 
whole.298 Methodologically individualistic notions would fail to capture 
these elements about the construction of  interest, thus further justifying 
the importance of  taking a cultural approach when looking at China as a 
non-Western global actor in a global order reflective of  Western 
hegemony.  
 
5.4 Culture, Domestic Politics, and Policy Connection 
 The importance of  culture in this analysis cannot be understated, 
especially as cultural norms and structures affect development policy. 
This applies more broadly to international relations theory. As the 
international system moves towards multipolarity, the rise of  non-
Western actors means the increasing importance of  theoretical 
approaches that can adequately capture greater diversity of  influence.  
 As a crucial characteristic of  domestic politics, culture: “shapes a nation's 
behaviours and its development pattern.”299 These ideas form the basis 
of  political structures. As emphasised by Lancaster, domestic politics is 
crucial to development policy.300 This thesis has outlined how domestic 
political transformations have a major impact on development policy. 
This includes China's move from communist ideology to pragmatism 
and the European Union's trajectory from a focus on economic and 
preferential trade to emphasis on free trade and a more of  a politicised 
approach to development. The striking difference, is that China’s change 
in policy is not from one ideology to another, but beyond, ideology itself, 
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at least in principle.  
 The Chinese approach to governance places emphasis on adaptability in 
relation to local contexts in the implementation of  projects. This kind of  
flexibility is reflective of  pragmatism, as well as a long history of  
decentralisation in the local implementation of  centrally sanctioned 
programmes.301  This emphasis on implementation before regulation is 
one that allows for innovation in development projects. Though this 
approach may impact the individual rights of  citizens, the focus on 
communitarianism somehow justifies this.  
 In contrast, on the side of  the EU, governance is constrained by the rule 
of  law, ensuring that the rights of  individuals are safeguarded. EU 
governance is model-based, reflecting universalism in European culture. 
Within the EU this can be seen in the acquis communautaires, which are 
general political and economic requirements for potential members to 
join the Union. 
 The political cultural contexts within both the People's Republic of  
China and the European Union are indicative that domestic approaches 
to governance also reflect external approaches to development. In 
China's case, there is not an emphasis on exporting China's own 
development model, as was emphasised when Deng Xiaoping told then 
Ghana President Jerry John Rawlings:  
“[p]lease don't copy our model. If  there is any experience on our part, 
it is to formulate policies in light of  one's own national conditions.”302 
 This is in contrast to the European Union's approach to development 
which includes adherence to standardised political conditionalities 
through universal reforms. These reforms are advocated through good 
governance initiatives, emphasising the adoption of  neoliberal 
economics and liberal democratic politics the world over.  
 The importance of  domestic politics is also evident in internal changes 
being reflected in development policy. In the case of  the EU, relations 
with ACP countries under the Lomé Conventions were chiefly 
economic, just as the erstwhile EEC largely focussed on economic issues. 
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As the EU was formed with the Maastricht Treaty, the now Union 
moved more towards political integration, which itself  was reflected in 
more politicised relations with the ACP countries under the Cotonou 
Agreement.  
 As for the People's Republic of  China, its initial involvement in Africa 
was representative of  the same Maoist revolutionary ideology that was 
behind the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in the PRC. 
With the chairmanship of  Deng Xiaoping and a move towards 
incorporating a market economy, ideology would decrease in Beijing's 
development policy as much as it was decreasing domestically in 
importance. The ideological to pragmatic trajectory of  China's 
development approach in sub-Saharan Africa was highly influenced by 
domestic political changes.  
 The impact of  Chinese culture on its development policy is an 
affirmation of  the importance of  contextual ideas as the basis of  
politics. The assertion that domestic politics is important in creating 
development policy can be taken further to emphasise the impact of  
culture on a nation's development pattern.303 China's current status as a 
developing country means that development represents an issue of  the 
Chinese present. Thus, its present experience with pragmatic 
development policy affects its external policy.  
 In the case of  the European Union, domestic politics of  the present are 
also exported emphasising the neoliberal turn in Western political 
economy. The combined Western approach to development (the 
hegemonic development discourse) is not representative of  historical 
development patterns. This is in keeping with Ha-Joon Chang's assertion 
that the West, in falsely portraying their economic history as one 
supported by free trade, are “kicking away the ladder”, making it 
impossible for others to follow their real path of  development which 
included protectionism and government intervention in the economy as 
the rule rather than exception.304 Indeed, the hegemonic development 
discourse is constructed by an inaccurate self-perception of  the West. It 
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is inaccurate within the false history of  Western development and also in 
the idea that the present circumstances of  the West are directly applicable 
to developing nations, particularly those of  sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
5.5 Differing Conceptions of  Soft Power, Differing 
Contexts 
 The use of  different conceptions of  soft power is revealing of  the 
importance of  acknowledging the different contexts in which China and 
the EU develop their respective development policies. These dissimilar 
soft power approaches are influenced by cultural priorities including 
norms and respective historical positions. The European Union's use of  
soft imperialism in the sub-Saharan African context reflects a universalist 
culture, where the imperative is to spread European norms because they 
are premised to be applicable everywhere. On the other hand, China's 
soft use of  power approach is reflective of  Chinese cultural values 
surrounding social relations, largely based on Confucian thought.  
 The spread of  norms is an important aspect of  European soft power as 
the EU's political ideals are self-perceived as one of  their greatest assets. 
These notions of  soft power correspond with the European cultural 
disposition towards universalism. European norms have added 
legitimacy, particularly as they are in keeping with the prevailing liberal 
democratic ideals of  the hegemonic global order. The EU's hegemonic 
position is reflected in the concept of  soft imperialism, representative of  
the imposition of  norms within the context of  uneven relative power 
relations, a characteristic that has become essential to the hegemonic 
development discourse. These norms, or conditionalities are both 
economic and political. The asymmetry of  power required for soft 
imperialism to be present, very much exists in relations between the EU 
and sub-Saharan African nations, all of  which were at some point 
colonised by a European nation. In some way this asymmetry of  power 
is a continuation of  the historical, colonial dynamic. Civilian power exists 
in relations of  greater symmetry, which is exemplified by EU-China 
relations, which focus on trade facilitation with political dialogue 
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secondary, and on equal terms.305 This is the case, despite the fact that 
China's political system is contrary to the liberal democratic principles of  
Europe, and of  the global order as a whole.  
 The Chinese 'soft use of  power' approach is a more appropriate 
construct for the analysis of  China as a global actor, because this 
paradigm is influenced by cultural institutions compatible with soft 
power.306 Confucian ideals such as the Golden Mean, ensuring balanced 
relationships that push towards achieving harmony, ensure that China's 
approach with international partners is soft, or prudent, in nature.307 It 
should also be emphasised that the Chinese notion of  guanxi, previously 
discussed, stresses  confidence-building, towards maintaining long-term, 
mutually beneficial relationships. These cultural aspects demonstrate the 
importance of  placing the conceptualisation of  soft power within the 
context of  the actor in question. Culture and soft power are intertwined 
for China.  
 Another important aspect of  soft power is on the level of  attractiveness, 
including domestic culture, and institutions. Nye argues that China's soft 
power will not increase because it does not possess an attractive (open, 
liberal democratic) political system.308  South African President Jacob 
Zuma has openly pondered to the contrary, wondering whether 
economic development can be achieved through similar “political 
discipline” to that of  China: 
The developing world was told that if  it did not Westernise and change 
its political systems to mirror those of  the West, they could forget about 
achieving economic growth and development. Now we are asking what 
we could learn from other political systems and cultures? Is the political 
discipline in China a recipe for economic success for example?309 
The essential feature of  China's attractiveness for developing countries 
therefore may not be the openness of  their political system, so much as 
that system has demonstrated its success in economic development. The 
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attractiveness of  China's rapid economic development is perhaps 
increased when considering it has been accomplished without the 
politico-economic restructuring advocated by the West.  
 The EU undoubtedly wields soft power for the attractiveness of  
regionalism and democratic political structures along with an affluent 
level of  development. Nevertheless, the European Union's soft 
imperialism in sub-Saharan Africa surely must work against this appeal. 
Perhaps what is missing in Nye's assumption on the attractiveness of  the 
Western political system, is the negative historical impact of  the 
imposition of  Western political structures during the colonial and 
postcolonial periods.  
 China's soft power would seem to have more appeal to elites, as it 
provides legitimisation for political stability and economic development 
without the requirement of  democracy. For African civil society, 
however, the democratic ideal holds greater sway as, for civil society to 
hold influence, democracy is almost certainly required. What is certainly 
true of  the increasing involvement of  China in sub-Saharan Africa, is 
that the European Union's soft imperialist position is being increasingly 
compromised. 
 
5.6 EU Placement within Hegemonic Global Order 
 The most important aspect of  European development policy is that it is 
firmly placed within the hegemonic global political order. The liberal 
democratic and neoliberal priorities of  that order, or systemic culture are 
essential features of  the hegemonic development discourse. EU policy 
being consistent with that of  the hegemonic global order is revealing of  
dynamics that do not allow for simple comparison. Eurocentrism is not 
only found in international relations theory but also in practice due to 
the European origins and continued Western dominance of  the 
international system. As proponents of  non-Western IR theory suggest, 
international relations are not synonymous with inter-European 
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international life.310 
 As emphasised in this thesis, liberal democracy, the rule of  law and good 
governance form core components of  EU political conditionalities, 
along with neoliberal economic principles form core components of  the 
EU's discourse on development. These are also norms of  the hegemonic 
global order, the preeminent global systemic culture, and they form part of  
Cox's criteria for 'world hegemony' including: “universal norms, 
institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of  behaviour 
for states and for those forces of  civil society that act across national 
boundaries...”311 In the context of  development, the institutions defining 
“general rules of  behaviour” would include the Development Assistance 
Committee of  the OECD (with membership of  all ‘traditional’ donors) 
as well as the IMF and World Bank. These institutions reiterate the 
legitimacy of  neoliberal economic norms, and the attachment of  liberal 
democratic norms to the nation-state. That is to say that from a global 
order perspective, these norms are required for legitimacy. China poses a 
challenge to this order, because it defies the premise that legitimate 
nation states must be democratic in several ways. The People's Republic 
of  China itself  is an authoritarian state, while its foreign policy also 
advocates for the right of  each nation to choose its own social and 
political systems. However, it should be noted that this does not entail a 
direct promotion of  authoritarian political structures either. 
 The emphasis put on the spread of  norms, especially through the 
hegemonic development discourse, is reflective of  Foucault's concept, 
the society of  normalisation, where mechanisms of  power promote the 
propagation of  norms.312 The concept of  'regimes of  truth' is also 
important here as this powerful normative discourse legitimates itself.313 
The legitimisation of  EU development policy through association with 
international institutions is exemplified in EU policy in the Cotonou 
Agreement, where the institution of  free-trade Economic Partnership 
Agreements is justified by their compliance with World Trade 
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Organisation regulations, and not because of  an informed debate about 
the merit of  these policies from a development perspective. 
 The hegemonic development discourse contains within it essential 
features which Western political culture seeks to spread. Justification for 
spreading Western political norms lies in the assumption that they are 
universal, which is central to a Eurocentric worldview which privileges 
the Western model of  development, and seeks to export it. Two such 
conceptions are Eurocentric developmentalism, the belief  that Europe, 
as the most developed region, has an obligation to develop the rest of  
the world and Eurocentric diffusionism, the idea that Europe progresses 
and modernises while non-Europe regresses and is traditional and 
backward.314 Europe's self-perception as modern and developed relies on 
such concepts as progress, productivity, and secularism.315 These are part 
of  modernisation thinking which assumes a linear path from 
underdeveloped to developed based on European conceptions of  
modernity, universal norms, social equality, democracy, (political and 
civil) human rights and capitalism.316 As discussed, the development 
discourse can be viewed as the most important advocacy for Western 
political norms. Of  any theme in Africa, debates on the state are the 
most pontifical and teleological of  all.317 The norms forwarded by the 
hegemonic development discourse are consistent with important norms 
of  the hegemonic global order, thus as China challenges the mainstream 
approach to development, it also represents in some way a challenge to 
the broader order. 
 As has been explored here, the hegemonic development discourse has an 
emphasis on good governance towards the aim of  establishing state 
capacity for neoliberal market reform. Neoliberalism puts emphasis on 
individual entrepreneurial freedom through establishing a free market 
and free trade, while diminishing the direct role of  the government in 
the economy through privatisation.318 This formed the core of  the 
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'Washington Consensus' and its focus on market-led development, as 
opposed to state-led development.319 As identified earlier, the shift to 
neoliberal economic policy can be seen in the shift from preferential 
trade under the Lomé Convention to free trade under the Cotonou 
Agreement. The emphasis on neoliberal economic policy in development 
is also representative of  a contradiction with the stated goal of  poverty 
eradication, as the former arguably exacerbates the latter.320 Another 
contradiction that undermines the legitimacy of  EU development policy 
is the continuation of  massive agricultural subsidies, through the 
Common Agricultural Policy, which negatively impacts African 
agricultural producers.321  
 As EU aid became more politicised in the 1990s, good governance 
reforms emerged, aimed towards improving “efficiency, authority and 
accountability” of  recipient countries.322  While these are framed as 
democratic political reforms, the goals of  good governance including 
establishing the rule of  law and tackling corruption are in fact more in 
the interest of  market reform. The promotion of  these norms is thus in 
keeping with the policies of  the Development Assistance Committee of  
the OECD, representing the interests of  the 'traditional donors'. The 
EU's support for good governance extends to the New Partnership for 
Africa's Development, an African Union driven organisation criticised 
for modelling itself  on Washington Consensus ideas, with European 
support reflecting ignorance that European policies have been ineffective 
in promoting development in Africa.323 Support for NEPAD and for 
good governance represents what Taylor calls the “dominance of  
technocratic neoliberal thinking”324 Good governance also serves the 
discursive purpose of  legitimising European development policy for the 
domestic audience, as it is associated with democracy and 
accountability.325 
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 The EU's status is controversial in Africa, as it perceives itself  as having 
“no past” despite several facts.326 Firstly, the EU consists of  all former 
African colonial powers. Secondly, the EU continues to push for political 
changes from what is arguably a neocolonial position of  relative power. 
Despite the fact that the EU frame's itself  as a 'force for good' through 
the spread of  core norms, Hyde-Price's assertion that this is a “discursive 
instrument” for the legitimacy of  EU development policy is an 
important point.327  Indeed, the EU's policies do not stress the core 
political norms including democracy and human rights as much as they 
focus on neoliberal economic reform.  
 While the Western paradigm claims the moral high ground due to its 
association with democratic governance, it must be noted that the form 
of  liberal democracy, along with neoliberal economy, promoted in sub-
Saharan Africa is very different from popular democracy. Especially 
neoliberal reforms can exacerbate poverty, causing further 
marginalisation.328 Indeed, despite the EU's claims at the universality of  
its norms, one can note “widespread questioning of  universalism and of  
the whole modernist paradigm with its assumptions about the 
convergence of  societies on a single model.”329 
 
5.7 EU-China Interdependency 
 The European Union's relationship with the People's Republic of  China 
is characterised as one of  civilian power. That is to say there is a relative 
power balance, thus the EU's promotion of  norms and use of  soft 
power in this instance is diminished. This, as has been previously 
emphasised, is very different to the EU's approach in Africa, where an 
uneven power balance in Europe's favour allows for a policy of  soft 
imperialism, where norms are imposed rather than simply discussed. 
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 Though China's approach to development is impacting the EU's political 
priorities in Africa, the EU's ability to react is certainly constrained by 
EU-China interdependence. The EU's approach, thus cannot be one of  
dictates, even though without economic interdependence, it almost 
certainly would look that way. Instead, the EU must opt for a dialogue of  
equals, in keeping with the civilian power approach. Thus, there has been 
the establishment of  the EU-China-Africa trilateral dialogue on 
development, discussed below. 
 The EU has thus committed to having dialogue with China regarding the 
coordination of  development efforts. This has included bilateral dialogue 
through EU-China meetings, as well as the establishment of  trilateral 
EU-China-Africa cooperation.330 There was an EU-China-Africa meeting 
in June 2007 attended by diplomats, academics and other stakeholders.331 
Ultimately, however, the attempt to institutionalise the EU-China-Africa 
dialogue has faltered, as the Chinese have backed out due to apparent 
African anger at the proposal of  trilateral cooperation. This was revealed 
in a classified communiqué of  the American Embassy in Beijing, which 
also quoted Julius Ole Sunkuli, Kenya’s Ambassador to the PRC, saying 
that “Africa had nothing to gain from China cooperating with the 
international donor community” and concerned that: “China’s practical, 
bilateral approach…would be changed by ‘Western’ interference.”332 
There is also the issue of  whether or not Africa is an equal partner 
within the EU's envisioned trilateral cooperation. It was also revealed 
that much African frustration had to do with not being consulted on the 
planned trilateral cooperation: “[African countries] argued that the third 
party in these nominally trilateral discussions was conspicuously absent. 
They perceived this as a Western attempt to rein in China’s Africa 
assistance.”333 African states are discussed as fearful of  losing leverage if  
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development partners cooperated.334 There is also the perception that 
China has indeed changed the behaviour of  Western actors, with the EU 
in particular proposing infrastructure projects after having abandoned 
them.335 
 The prospect for outright China-EU development partnership seems 
slim, especially as each actor has a strong position: “[i]t is not possible 
for either the EU or China to define a partnership with the African 
continent while insisting on a monopoly of  legitimacy for their own 
approach.”336 This forms the first part of  three key challenges identified 
by Berger and Wissenbach for EU-China development cooperation in 
Africa: strategic partnership between the EU and China given 
contradictory approaches; African management of  multiple partnerships; 
and Chinese consideration of  the expectations of  other actors. 337 The 
expectations of  other actors especially refers to those of  the traditional 
donors. China has engaged with Western development actors in 
partnerships including the World Bank and the UK Department for 
International Development.338 A certain level of  engagement is in 
keeping with the PRC's broader priorities of  deeper integration into the 
global economy.339  Despite this engagement, China’s willingness to alter 
their development discourse and adopt similar perspectives to the 
hegemonic development discourse seems improbable. Though China 
engages the global community more and more, for the growth of  its 
economy, and for the assurance of  stability, China's internal political 
culture, structures and issues prevent the adoption of  the kind of  
universalist perspectives that characterise the hegemonic development 
discourse. 
 Attempts to universalise the European experience through the 
hegemonic development discourse is in stark contrast to China's policies 
of  non-interference and mutual respect. With approaches strengthened 
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by Chinese cultural traditions that emphasise respect for diversity, China 
also differs from Europe as they do not overtly seek to push their 
development model on others. This is not to say, however, that China's 
model of  development does not increase the country's attractiveness as a  
partner to assist in the development of  sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
5.8 Chinese Cultural Outlook 
 The importance of  understanding the cultural context of  Chinese 
foreign policy has been stressed throughout the thesis. China's cultural 
worldview is very different from that of  the EU, and cultural norms very 
much affect Chinese foreign policy as a whole and development policy in 
particular. Understanding the Chinese historical and cultural context is 
important when considering that the differences between China’s 
conception of  development and that of  the EU, is just the latest in a 
centuries old history of  resistance to Western universalist norms.340 
Nonetheless, the combination of  Chinese resilience and adaptation to 
the influence of  Western ideas is revealing of  China’s adaptability and of  
the contradictions that can arise from a political system with an emphasis 
on pragmatism.  
 China has been faced with the dilemma of  adapting certain Western 
ideas (especially related to the capitalist market) while at the same time 
preserving Chinese society (however adaptive to capitalism). Does 
China’s increasing experience with Western ideas and increasing 
interdependence make the chance for compromise or dialogue relatively 
high? It is difficult to say how the PRC will deal with this “serious 
contradiction” moving forward.341 The durability, and resurgence of  
traditional ideas in Chinese society is demonstrative of  the fact that it 
remains hierarchical with a focus on the collective.342  
 Chinese pragmatism and the dampening of  communist ideology reveals 
a system where responses to development issues are not entirely framed 
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along ideological lines. The contestation of  ideology is not simply an 
attack against the West because of  anti-Western sentiment, it is also an 
extension of  the Chinese political system, where since the Deng era, the 
importance of  ideology has diminished. It is also very much a product 
of  China's rejuvenation of  Confucian ideals where thinking on harmony, 
on adhering to the Golden Mean as a means of  attaining stable long-
term goals without confrontation is all important.343 The aggressive 
forwarding of  political ideology is viewed as counter to these ideals, and 
thus it must be transcended.344 
 
 An understanding of  the reemergence of  Confucian cultural norms in 
Chinese foreign policy gives important indications as to future action. 
The move towards pragmatism, the promotion of  prudent or soft use of  
power, and the avoidance of  both ideology and the power politics of  
“hostile balancing or war” are important elements of  reassurance to the 
global system as a whole.345 The cultural basis of  China's foreign policy is 
significant as it is cultural values that lay out the use of  power in a soft 
way. 346 China’s pursuit of  mutual benefit in its development relations 
with sub-Saharan Africa does not just represent South-South strategic 
rhetoric, it also finds a basis in Confucian thinking emphasising the 
importance of  treating other nations with kindness.347 
 The cultural perspective of  Chinese foreign policy, supportive of  
diversity, represents a challenge to universalism and thus to the 
universality of  democracy. Chinese society has been identified as having 
few democracy-supporting social structures.348 Domestic societal reality, 
with little support for democracy in China's social structures, is reflected 
in foreign and development policy, and represents a challenge to the 
hegemonic liberal democratic order.349 At the same time, China does not 
seek to impose political structures on others.  
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5.9 Differences in China's Aid Approach 
 Whether or not Chinese aid and investment can be separated is an 
important question due to the overlap between Chinese national and 
commercial interests coupled with a broad definition of  what constitutes 
“aid”.350 The state-business approach of  the Chinese government 
significantly broadens the role of  the Chinese state in comparison with 
the European Union and other traditional donors. This willingness to 
“change old patterns” is in keeping with the Chinese pragmatic tradition. 
351 Indeed, this is represented domestically as the PRC selectively 
implements neoliberal reforms, while maintaining a strong 
developmental state, ignoring the hegemonic norm. This is surely part of  
China’s attractiveness as a partner and as an example of  a developmental 
state for African nations to follow. It is clear that the PRC does not want 
to be bound by convention arbitrarily, this of  course would affect policy 
options and run against the pragmatic approach to policy in general. 
Where China is bound by international agreements, such as its signing of  
the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, they have used their own 
interpretation in measuring success and compliance.352 
 Returning to the process of  Chinese aid, in instances where there is 
Chinese financing for aid projects, the proposals come first from the 
potential recipient government.353 This is a reaffirmation of  the 
sovereignty of  China’s bilateral partners, as well as ensuring that China is 
perceived as an equal partner, as opposed to a soft imperialist partner. 
This, along with absence of  political conditionalities or rhetoric 
concerning the internal politics of  African partners, appeals to African 
elites, such as Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who feel that the West 
has no right in suggesting that African trade with China will inherently 
damage prospects for democracy, as the US and EU themselves engage 
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in heavy trade with the PRC without facing such criticisms.354 This is 
coupled with Chinese statements on the right of  nations to develop 
distinct social and political systems. Such rhetoric is also found in joint 
African-Chinese statements in the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation.355 All of  this links to reaffirming the supremacy of  the 
state, which is central to Chinese foreign and development policies. This 
resonates with Third World political elites, as sovereignty and non-
intervention continue to be relevant issues in the global South.356 
 The Chinese approach also promotes an older understanding of  the 
development trajectory where state capacity comes as a consequence of  
development, not the other way around.357 Fundamental to this is the 
distinction between an economic and social rights perspective and a 
political and civil rights perspective. It is quite clear that good 
governance initiatives are meant to promote the latter, and that the 
neoliberal approach to development actually damage the former. 
 China’s approach is inherently pragmatic as it includes virtual money 
transfer (transfer of  funds directly to the Chinese contractor as opposed 
to through the African government) in the instance of  aid projects, 
leaving little chance for corruption.358 This demonstrates that despite the 
fact that there is an absence of  political conditionalities and a lower level 
of  transparency in China’s aid to Africa, there is still an interest in aid 
effectiveness.  
 
5.10 China's Alternative Order 
 Ultimately to see the impact that China is having on EU (hegemonic) 
development objectives in sub-Saharan Africa, the question to address is 
whether or not there is a shift happening in development discourse with 
China’s increasing involvement in sub-Saharan Africa. In social 
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constructivist terms, this question would be whether or not China is 
promoting an alternative systemic culture surrounding development. As 
the contemporary development discourse has been directly linked to the 
hegemonic global order, an alternative systemic culture in development 
would also represent a challenge to the broader neoliberal and liberal 
democratic order.  
 If  China is promoting a discursive shift in development it is certainly to 
move towards Third Worldist principles of  non-interference and mutual 
respect. China does not actively promote its own development model, 
nonetheless the so-called Beijing Consensus has become central to the 
discourse around China’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa. This is 
where a: “liberal market economy exists under an authoritarian political 
system.”359 Though it may also refer simply to selective application of  the 
neoliberal model.360 The important part is that political and economic 
systems should reflect a nation’s specific needs and not a universal 
conception of  the nation-state. 
 China’s foreign policy continues to be infused with ideas surrounding 
anti-hegemony. As has also been extensively discussed, Confucian 
thought advocates for balance, and respect for diversity, something that 
counters the kind of  universalist ideology propagated by the presently 
hegemonic West (the EU included). Thus, as China seeks to regain its 
status as a “benevolent great power”, compromising on the anti-
hegemonic stance would be of  little benefit.361 China also has an anti-
hegemonic foreign policy due to domestic concerns regarding the 
sovereignty of  the PRC. These include the issues of  Taiwan, Tibet and 
Xinjiang. The negative historical experience with colonialism, and 
subsequent psychological burden of  humiliation also strengthen’s China’s 
anti-hegemonic position. China’s historical anxieties regarding 
interference of  hegemonic powers in internal affairs are also felt to be a 
present issue especially given American involvement in East Asia, 
including support for Taiwan.362 These issues make it difficult to imagine 
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China making major changes in its foreign policy that would reflect the 
concerns of  the hegemonic development discourse, as their approach to 
development is reflective of  universalism, which runs in direct 
opposition to Chinese cultural particularism, as well as policies of  non-
interference and mutual respect.  
 It is the search for strategic partners that underlay the historical 
importance of  African nations both in the People’s Republic of  China’s 
accession to the United Nations and in its search for international allies 
in light of  international condemnation of  China’s human rights record 
after the Tiananmen incident of  1989. In return, China has in principle 
defended the sovereign rights of  African partners, though there are 
exceptions where China’s international image is at stake, such as in 
eventual Chinese support for peacekeepers in Darfur.363 China has 
become increasingly aware of  the effect of  its development cooperation 
with certain regimes on its international image.364 
 
 The discourse within the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation coming 
from China has explicitly stated the aim of  achieving: “the emergence of  
a just and equitable new political and economic order by fostering unity 
among developing countries.”365 Within the Forum, statements from 
African leaders rarely denounce the Western order, though they do 
emphasise the positive nature of  China’s involvement in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and thus the existence of  an 
alternative systemic culture can be explained through Wendt's collective 
identity formation concept explained in the theory chapter.366 The 
foundation of  interaction is of  course self-restraint, which is of  course 
demonstrated through principles of  non-interference and mutual 
respect. These are not only central to Chinese foreign policy but have 
been important concepts in the Third World including the Non-Alligned 
                                                 
363 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is 
Beijing Parting With Pariahs?,” Foreign Policy, February 2008, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63045/stephanie-kleine-ahlbrandt-and-andrew-
small/chinas-new-dictatorship-diplomacy. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Alden and Alves, “China and Africa’s Natural Resources,” 8. 
366 Wendt, Social Theory of  International Politics, 318, 353. 
110 
Movement, which represents an association with a previously existing 
systemic culture. Economic interdependence is the most obvious factor 
that binds FOCAC together, with reciprocal (though not necessarily 
even) benefits for both sides. It can be argued that there is political 
interdependence as well, including support at the United Nations, and 
support for right to choose political and economic systems for 
development. This also points somehow to a form of  homogeneity, as it 
is in the interest of  all parties to have policy space, and for China 
particularly to have the right to a legitimate political system without 
adhering to the political norms of  the hegemonic global order. 
 
 As was stated in the theoretical section, it is possible for systemic 
cultures to be renegotiated. China’s alternative culture represents an 
alternative. China’s impact is perhaps already visible due to softening in 
World Bank and EU approaches moving forward. The EU is looking to 
shift away from conditional aid towards the provision of  political and 
financial incentives for meeting good governance standards.367 Also, 
Justin Yifu Lin, Chief  Economist of  the World Bank has conceded that 
governance is likely directly linked to “state of  economic 
development.”368 These kinds of  changes from the orthodoxy of  the 
hegemonic development discourse are minor, though they may be an 
indication that the presence of  China is forcing European and Western 
institutions to soften their position on conditionalities.   
 China's more explicit opposition to the global order in the context of  
African development may have to do with the fact that on the continent, 
there is less of  a need for assurance that other nations do not need to 
balance against China.369 
 China’s position does weaken European soft imperialism in Africa, as it 
gives an alternative option to sub-Saharan African countries, thus 
opening up policy space for development strategies outside of  the 
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traditional donor box.370 China’s rejection of  political conditionalities and 
explicit pursuit of  alternative development and an alternative 
international political and economic order certainly challenges EU 
normative interests. China’s position does not appear as though it will 
converge with that of  the EU. This is due to that fact that Chinese 
discursive legitimacy relies on its opposition to the hegemonic global 
order and the interconnected development discourse. As discussed, 
China has earned its anti-hegemonic credentials through development 
assistance in sub-Saharan Africa dating back to the 1950s. It would be 
naïve to think that China would adopt the Western approach to 
development as a universalist approach which is contrary to Chinese 
cultural perspectives, historical experience with colonisation and their 
important position in South-South relations. Despite the strength of  
China’s position, the commitment of  the PRC to a peaceful rise and 
promoting harmony in the global system, conscious of  their own image 
as a benevolent great power, there is still great potential for softening of  
China’s discourse, and for dialogue with the traditional donors, and the 
EU in particular.  
 
5.11 Application of  Constrained Relativism 
 If  we admit for the importance of  culture in the construction of  
development policy and the assertion of  foreign policy, then it is possible 
to imagine how mutual understanding can be forged by relative cultural 
compatibility. The example given in the theoretical chapter was of  EU 
culture being more individualistic therefore having less mutual 
accountability, while China's culture is more communalistic, thus there is 
more mutual accountability.371  These are representative of  two cultures 
with divergent forms of  social solidarity. According to the theory of  
constrained relativism, Chinese culture could be termed as hierarchical, 
where social accountability exists with fettered competition, while (the 
neoliberal model of  European culture) is characterised by extreme 
individualism, thus social unaccountability and unfettered competition 
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are promoted.372   
 As far as compatibility is concerned, it is beyond the scope of  this thesis 
to address the (rather challenging) question of  African culture, especially 
as it relates to international relations. However, mindful of  African 
communalism, an interesting question is whether or not similar Chinese 
social solidarities regarding accountability would make China a stronger 
partner for Africa in terms of  mutual trust and understanding. Gyekye 
argues that African cultures are predisposed towards communalism and 
accountability.  This includes the concept of  ubuntu—“a person is a 
person through persons”—, which Shutte argues “is common to all 
African languages and traditional cultures.”373 This provides a very 
interesting question for future research.  
 
5.12 African Prospects 
 An important question for future research is what kind of  changes in 
political and economic development will occur in sub-Saharan Africa as a 
result of  China's great increase in involvement since the late 1990s. As 
China's development discourse and approach challenges the dominance 
of  the Western conception of  development, greater policy space will be 
opened up. How this policy space might change African politics in light 
of  increased independence from the hegemonic global is an intriguing 
prospect.  
 China's presence creates many economic opportunities for African 
countries including getting out of  colonial trade structure.374 The PRC is 
investing in areas, such as infrastructure, that were long abandoned by 
the traditional donors.375 From the perspective of  African political elites, 
Chinese involvement creates leverage as development assistance comes 
from an increasing number of  partners. A major part of  this leverage is 
the fact that China's key perspectives on development cooperation 
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including non-interference, mutual respect, and thus the ability to choose 
models appropriate for developmental needs are divergent from those of  
the hegemonic development discourse. Thus, the opportunity is also for 
greater policy space, and arguably policy independence for sub-Saharan 
African nations to chart their development with minimised external 
influence/coercion.  
 The increased policy space perhaps provides for the possibility for 
opening of  political space for a process similar to Foucault's genealogy, 
finding forms of  the body politic that have been suppressed by the 
colonial and nation states. Otherwise, it is possible to imagine new 
political conceptions, equally owned locally and attached to local culture 
as opposed to being outside impositions.  
 The leverage gained has great potential for sub-Saharan Africa, especially 
as this new negotiating power, along with the opportunities for 
development, Africa stands to have a stronger politico-economic 
position in the global system.376 “South-South cooperation has become a 
viable feature of  globalisation where Africans are treated as equal 
business partners and not belittled in their self-esteem as recipients of  
charitable donations from the industrialised world.”377 Indeed, China 
treats Africa as an opportunity, not as a burden.378  
While from the perspective of  political elites, China's approach to 
development is attractive, the perspective of  African civil society is 
different. This is especially due to the fact that the existence of  a 
“vibrant civil society” does not find itself  in China's definition of  
development.379 African civil society grows increasingly concerned, 
especially with issues such as lack of  transparency involved with Chinese 
aid, as well as labour conditions in Chinese development projects.  
Despite concerns from civil society, from an economic perspective, 
China has demonstrated the possibility for pragmatic, state-led 
development within the global capitalist system. Given the negative 
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history with neoliberal reforms, the support of  China and its domestic 
development example will create optimism for alternatives to neoliberal 
capitalism in African development.  
 It will remain to be seen is whether or not African political elites can 
develop national or regional politico-economic strategies that can 
forward own development approaches, while at the same time mitigating 
the risks of  over-dependence on China.380 Only time will tell whether 
these opportunities for a new direction, and indeed a new discourse on 
development, can be achieved.  
 
5.13 Conclusion 
 The European Union's approach to development is focussed on the 
export of  universalist norms in an uneven way that is exemplary of  soft 
imperialism. The norms imposed through political conditionalities 
include neoliberal economic reform, which is supported on the political 
side by institutional restructuring in the form of  good governance. 
Though the discursive emphasis of  good governance is on democracy 
and human rights, its main function is to create the institutional 
(governmental) basis for the implementation of  neoliberal economic 
reforms including opening the market, reducing government role in the 
market especially through privatisation and promoting free trade. This 
approach is in contrast to the historical development patterns of  any of  
the traditional donors in the region, which involved protectionist 
measures, and government intervention in the economy.381 
  The European Union is part of  the hegemonic development 
discourse, which contains within it the most important political advocacy 
for the hegemonic world order. That is to say, that the political 
programme of  that order, driven by the West, is itself  intertwined with 
their governmental and thus aid approaches to development. This is not 
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coincidental, as domestic political priorities inform external development 
policy.382 
 China has emerged over the past fifteen years as an increasing alternative 
to the liberal democratic and neoliberal development approach of  the 
traditional donors and International Financial Institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank. China's approach to 
development externally differs from than that of  the West, as previously 
discussed stark cultural and historical differences inform the PRC's non-
interference and mutual respect policies. It has been charged in the West 
that China's foreign policy is simply contrarian; this is an extreme 
simplification.383 The mixture of  pragmatism, seeking for balanced social 
relations, combined with historical learning from the colonial mistakes 
of  the West and an understanding of  the humiliation that comes with 
being the victim of  colonialism, has reinforced the strength of  China's 
unwillingness to subvert other nations. This is part of  an intricate and 
calculated pursuit of  long-term interests not only economic but also 
including peace and harmony with other countries. It must be stressed 
that the latter goals are not altruistic in nature; a stable situation is 
understood to be necessary for maintaining China's emerging position as 
a global power, while the maintenance of  stability also assures that the 
chance of  confrontation and rivalry with other powers is kept to a 
minimum. 
 Inasmuch as China's development discourse in Africa refuses to adhere 
to the approach of  traditional powers, it represents an alternative 
systemic culture to the present global order. Indeed, in statements within 
the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, there has been an explicit 
emphasis on pursuing a new economic and political order. The challenge 
posed, however, is not entirely ideological. While the hegemonic global 
order's policies are framed by neoliberal economic and liberal democratic 
political ideology, especially triumphalist since the end of  the Cold War; 
China's approach is more reflective of  pragmatism rooted in 
Confucianism. China's approach does not seek the homogenisation of  
states as the Soviet communist and Western liberal democratic ideologies 
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have. Instead, the approach explicitly seeks the acceptance of  diversity 
of  social and political systems, with differing approaches to 
development, political and economic structures, and human rights. 
Though this approach is not purely ideological in nature, it does 
challenge the supremacy of  liberal democracy as the basis of  legitimacy 
for nation states in the global system. China's own state capitalism, 
increasingly influencing African political elites, also challenges the 
supremacy of  neoliberal economic doctrine, another pillar of  the 
Western-driven hegemonic global order. The extent of  China's challenge 
to the hegemonic order will depend on its pragmatism and on its 
interdependency with both Africa and the EU and the West generally.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
 This thesis has identified contrasts in EU and Chinese development 
policy that inform their mutual interaction, as well as the impact their 
discursive interplay has, especially on policy options in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This conclusion reviews the findings of  the thesis in terms of  
this interplay between EU and Chinese policies in development in the 
areas of  domestic policies and culture, which ultimately inform the 
construction of  development policy, that form systemic cultures at the 
highest level internationally. This conclusion is organised according to 
the contextual aspects that come into play when analysing emerging 
development actors versus traditional ones; namely:  domestic politics, 
culture and  systemic culture. Throughout this section possible directions 
for future research are also noted. 
 
 The importance of  domestic politics influencing the construction of  
external development policy has been emphasised throughout the thesis. 
The European Union is a unique political formation, as a union of  
liberal democratic nations with interlinking economic, political, legal and 
social institutions. The European approach to governance, which has an 
important bearing on development-thinking, emphasises the rule of  law 
(and the safeguarding of  individual political and civil rights), and 
implementation through standardised models. This is reflective of  
European cultural universalism.  
 The People's Republic of  China is the world's preeminent non-
democratic power, with an authoritarian political system run by the 
Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese approach to governance is 
informed by a cultural disposition towards pragmatism, with 
implementation of  projects decentralised, and generally adaptable to 
local conditions. With an emphasis on the collective, projects are often 
undertaken before a legal framework exists, thus enhancing the statist 
ability to experiment with various methods, and to innovate, while 
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potentially hampering the rights of  individuals. This approach is 
somehow tolerated due to an emphasis on the economic and social rights 
of  the collective as opposed to individuals (though this is of  course not 
always the case). 
 The form of  governance of  each actor is important in several ways. 
Firstly, it is reflected in development policy as the European approach is 
characterised more by the implementation of  universal models while 
China's approach to development is not to export China's model, and 
instead to promote adaptability diverse local contexts. Secondly, 
governance forms part of  the internal political model of  each respective 
actor. As noted in the theoretical chapter, this forms a part of  the 
attractiveness of  each actor, a component of  soft power.  
 The emphasis of  European governance on civil and political rights is 
appealing to African civil society, as liberal democracy enhances public 
accountability. On the other hand, the attractiveness of  Europe's model 
for African political elites lies more closely to the legitimacy associated 
with it, as opposed to its functionality. In reality, given the politco-
economic development challenges of  many sub-Saharan African 
countries, and the history of  inadequacy of  Western-style reforms, the 
Chinese approach, especially with the ability for innovation, must be 
more attractive from a developmental statist perspective. Jacob Zuma’s 
comments cited in the previous chapter on whether African countries 
should adopt Chinese political structures to improve the development 
process support this perspective. 
 
 Another domestic factor that impacts the approach to development is 
the self-perceived level of  development of  each actor. Europe's 
approach to development could be viewed as inappropriate due to the 
fact that, at Europe's level of  development, different challenges are 
faced. Europe's approach to development policy is in keeping with the 
emphasis on good governance and neoliberal economic reform 
occurring internally.384 But as mentioned in the discussion, the EU, and 
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the hegemonic development discourse as a whole, have a false self-
perception of  how development is achieved, ignoring the fact that statist 
(protectionist) approaches were originally used to develop European 
national economies.  
 On the other hand, China considers itself  to be a developing country, a 
fact that reinforces its prominence in the developing world. While China 
has a more advanced economy than almost all of  its sub-Saharan African 
partners, China's development process has occurred rapidly over the last 
three decades. Underdevelopment was recent in China, indeed many 
parts of  China still face major development challenges. Thus, China's 
experience with the development process is much more current than that 
of  Europe. Combine this temporality with the pragmatic, state-led 
approach China takes toward development projects and it becomes clear 
that China is a much more attractive partner for economic development 
in sub-Saharan Africa. While Europe emphasises reforms under the 
assumption of  state capacity that does not necessarily exist, China's 
approach is compatible with the understanding that state capacity comes 
as a consequence of  development, it is not always feasibly a 
prerequisite.385  
 
 This thesis has emphasised how domestic politico-economic changes are 
reflected in development policy. The trajectory of  EU can be seen from 
a focus on economic development through trade agreements with the 
ACP countries under the Lomé Convention to the increasing 
politicisation of  EU development policy through the Cotonou 
Agreement. These agreements reflect an evolution from the 
economically-focussed EEC to the increasing political powers of  the 
European Union. 
 Chinese development assistance to Africa began as a revolutionary 
effort, to assist in independence struggles and anti-hegemonic 
development, while at the same time emphasising Maoist communist 
ideology. This approach has slowly shifted towards pragmatic 
development policy, in the sense of  strategic political partnership, mostly 
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focused on the safeguarding of  Chinese domestic priorities. China’s 
domestic priorities are not only economic; political concerns over 
sovereignty, along with historical humiliation by colonial powers and a 
cultural disposition towards diversity, means that anti-hegemony remains 
central in Chinese foreign policy. 
 Ultimately, with the counterpoint of  greater Chinese pragmatism and the 
politicisation of  European development policy, a key trend to observe in 
the coming years will be whether or not a greater Chinese presence in 
Africa will soften European insistence on political conditionalities, for 
instance. Signs are that this is beginning to happen, with an EU shift 
towards incentive based rewards for development partners, though the 
incentives are still based on good governance and neoliberal economics. 
China is certainly part of  this policy-change; the extent to which China is 
a factor should be a subject for further research.  
 
 The next factor, culture, as a major component of  domestic politics 
often ignored in political analysis, has been used as a lens throughout the 
thesis as essential to understanding the development discourses of  both 
the European Union and the People's Republic of  China. A major point 
of  divergence between the two actors' approaches is the counterpoint of  
European cultural universalism and Chinese cultural particularism. These 
distinctions underlie their respective systemic cultures, and their 
approaches to aid. They have also affected important concepts for the 
influence of  both actors in sub-Saharan Africa, namely soft power. 
Culture also has an important impact on the construction of  interests.  
 The conceptions of  soft power for both actors differ. A big influence on 
this is the cultural worldview. European soft power relies on Europe's 
normative power, which entails the spread of  treasured European 
political norms as a mission and legitimating force. This is an expression 
of  European cultural universalism (also encompassing 'Eurocentric 
diffusionism' and Eurocentric developmentalism'). The ultimate goal, 
from this perspective, is the attainment of  a homogenous global order, 
comprised of  liberal democratic nation states.  
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 China's approach to soft power, outlined with Li Mingjiang's soft use of  
power approach, is infused with culturally specific notions regarding 
balance in relations, mutually favourable agreements, overall benevolence 
and respect for diversity. These are means of  establishing harmony and 
thus stability in the international system. China’s respect for diversity 
corresponds with China's own cultural particularism. An important point 
for future research is the appeal of  diversity due to African cultural 
aspirations.  
 The counterpoint of  European cultural universalism and Chinese 
cultural particularism is a very important one in the context of  relations 
with Africa. European imposition of  political norms reminds of  the 
colonial era, though at the same time broad African desire for democracy 
should be recognised.386 However, it is important to differentiate 
between the democratic ideal and the Western imposition of  the liberal 
democratic model of  the nation-state along with a neoliberal economy. 
The latter imposition has restricted the policy space of  African 
governments, diminishing their ability to pursue politico-economic 
development policies regardless of  their adherence to the hegemonic 
development discourse. This is the paradox of  European soft power, 
while it may ideally be attractive, the imposition of  political 
conditionalities and the failure of  Western-style reforms has certainly 
diminished the attractiveness of  the EU as a development partner. 
Chinese soft power has strength in the simplicity of  non-interference 
and mutual respect, while having more intricate cultural perspectives on 
soft power that, if  followed, make China an attractive partner.  
 The construction of  interests is an important aspect when thinking of  
the present and future viability of  Chinese and European development 
relationships with sub-Saharan Africa. This is in light of  accusations that 
the Chinese are simply self-interested, and are pushing for a new kind of  
colonisation of  Africa.387 Not only does this idea of  Chinese colonisation 
run against Chinese policies of  non-interference and mutual respect as 
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well as the strategic importance of  African nations as political partners; 
this view oversimplifies China's set of  interests based on the assumption 
of  rational choice. 
 A focus on short-term, individual interest that is the core of  rational 
choice theory, is a Eurocentric assumption which is thus more applicable 
to the EU as an actor. Chinese interests have been demonstrated to be 
longer-term in nature, while the collectivist nature of  Chinese society 
promotes mutual accountability, thus making interests more complex. 
The focus on confidence-building, the maintenance of  long-term 
relationships (in the form of  guanxi) in Chinese culture extends to 
foreign policy, meaning that stable, long-term bilateral relations clearly 
fall within a Chinese construction of  interests.  
 China's more complex set of  interests may make them more competitive 
from the perspective of  relationships. This, along with China's anti-
hegemonic credentials which help its popularity among African political 
elites. Still, regarding anti-hegemony, China's historical relations with the 
sub-Saharan African country in particular would be an important 
factor.388 
 
 The thesis has argued for the existence of  competing systemic cultures 
around development. The European Union forms part of  the 
hegemonic development discourse containing the traditional donors and 
the international financial institutions while the other systemic culture 
consists of  African nations and China (as a de facto leader) under the 
auspices of  the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. 
 Each systemic culture is sustained by a discourse, and in this case both 
discourses are strong. European universalism means that the norms of  
the hegemonic development discourse and their legitimacy is very 
difficult to challenge, both from internal and external perspectives. From 
the Chinese perspective, cultural, historical and strategic positions that 
underlie China's leadership of  a new systemic culture around 
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development mean that their position is also inflexible.  
 Despite the stark differences in positions, the fact is that China's position 
is not politically invasive, nor does it promote an opposing ideological 
system that would directly dictate the domestic behaviour of  the nations 
under its influence. China's pragmatism, pursuit of  stability and desire 
for a peaceful rise along side the EU's soft power approach means that 
dialogue can exist. This is especially the case in the context of  high EU-
China economic interdependence. One difficulty concerning dialogue, 
however, is assuring that it equally includes African partners, as they still 
appear to have considerable influence on any attempt to have EU-China 
cooperation concerning development in Africa. 
 There are also key differences in the structure of  the differing systemic 
cultures around development of  which the EU and China are part. 
Europe’s systemic culture, the hegemonic development discourse, pushes 
for homogeneity of  the community of  nations, promoting the adoption 
of  liberal democratic political systems with neoliberal reformed markets. 
In the case of  the European Union, the promotion and imposition of  
this universalist vision has been achieved through uneven relations, or 
soft imperialism.  
 The structure of  the systemic culture revolving around the FOCAC is 
based on the political equality of  members, with non-interference and 
mutual respect as forms of  self-restraint. This systemic culture is first 
and foremost for reciprocal economic benefits, while also maintaining a 
certain form of  homogeneity, in the stated desire of  all members for the 
right of  nations to have their own particular political, economic and 
social systems.  
 The emergence of  FOCAC and China in Africa impacts the EU's 
position of  soft imperialism as African nations are offered an alternative 
to European conditionalities and models that reaffirms, at least 
rhetorically, political, economic, and cultural sovereignty. With China-
Africa relations strengthening year-by-year, and EU-China-Africa 
cooperation unsuccessful, African countries are gaining greater leverage 
with the EU, and the West as a whole. Indeed, this leverage demonstrates 
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the importance and attractiveness of  China-Africa relations for sub-
Saharan African political elites, giving a degree of  choice (policy space) 
unseen since the end of  the Cold War, and not containing the same kind 
of  stark ideological differences that characterised the former capitalist-
communist divide. The desire for African governments to maintain the 
leverage created by the Chinese presence was demonstrated in the 
discussion with quotations of  South African and Kenyan government 
representatives who oppose EU-China cooperation as it may in some 
way weaken China’s approach, thus weakening Africa’s position. 
 
 The form of  aid provision of  each actor is also significant. European 
development assistance is politicised, and is within the traditional, 
hegemonic development paradigm. The liberal democratic, good 
governance and neoliberal reform approach to development emphasises 
the reduction of  the state. The EU emphasises effectiveness of  aid 
through conditionalities, though this is changing towards incentives still 
reflecting the normative priorities of  the EU. In contrast, the Chinese 
approach to aid is first characterised by non-interference and mutual 
respect, the latter being reinforced by recipient ownership of  
development projects. That is to say that African governments have 
control over project proposals. These policies help to strengthen the 
supremacy of  the state, while the effectiveness of  the assistance is 
assured through virtual money transfer (for Chinese funded projects, 
directly to the contractor, so as to minimise corruption).  
 Ultimately, both China and the European Union are concerned with the 
effectiveness of  their development assistance; so far allegations that 
Chinese involvement increases corruption are largely unfounded. As for 
which approach will be favoured moving forward, it is likely that the 
traditional development discourse and its emphasis on the reduction of  
the state will lose hegemony, much as its legitimacy has already been 
heavily criticised in sub-Saharan Africa.389 The emphasis China puts on 
the supremacy of  the state, coupled with a developmental statist 
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approach to development, may be more favourable for the 
developmental needs of  sub-Saharan Africa. At the very least, the policy 
space opened by the Chinese option, creates greater politico-economic 
autonomy so that African nations can pursue suitable approaches to 
development. Ultimately, developmental success of  many sub-Saharan 
countries will rely on their ability to manage and balance their relations 
with both the EU and China in a constructive way, while assuring that 
increased investment, and potentially fewer conditionalities translate into 
appropriate development strategies for the future of  sub-Saharan Africa.  
 In summary, the EU's soft imperialist position, imposed through 
development assistance, has been diminished by the presence of  Chinese 
development policy in sub-Saharan Africa. Chinese culture promotes 
diversity and differs from European cultural universalism. The existence 
of  the Chinese option increases policy space for African governments. 
Due to major cultural and historical differences, China is unlikely to 
adopt a political approach to development that converges with that of  
the EU. Nonetheless, due to Chinese pragmatism and the EU’s soft 
power approach, as well as EU-China economic interdependence, 
political confrontation is highly unlikely and dialogue is possible. 
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